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INTRODUCTION 
At .the pres ent t ime , it  is quite clea r tha t the de - e s ca l a ­
t ion pro ce s s  o f  the United S t a t es mil it a ry p re s ence in S outhea s t  
As ia i s  a n  inevita b l e  ta s k ,  and th is proce s s  is a l ready underway .  
The American troops s ta t ione d in S outh Vietnam wil l be withdrawn 
and w i l l  be reduced in Tha iland . This  wil l caus e e conomic impa cts,  
both dire c t ly a nd ind irectly , on Tha iland . Tha il and is  one of the 
count ries tha t wa s cho s en as a p l a ce fo r Re s t  and Re cupera t ionl 
(R  and R) fo r the troop s in S outh Vie tnam , a nd Tha il a nd ha s  ga ined 
sub s tant ia l fo re ign excha nge through th is pol icy . Furthermore, 
the re a re s even American ba s e s  in Tha iland wh ich , o f  cours e , res ul t 
in expend itures for suppl ie s , s ervices and cons t ruct ion . The with­
drawa l o f  the Ame r ican forces  w i l l  reta rd e c onomic growth and o ther­
w ise  be ha rmful to  the economic s itua t ion o f  the country a s  a who l e . 
Perplexingly , the Tha i Government and its  e conomic a genc ie s contend 
tha t the impa c t s  a re very sma l l  a nd wil l no t reta rd economic grow th 
o r  be ha rmful to the economy . I have the oppos ite po int o f  view . 
The w ithdrawa l wil l subs tant ia l ly re ta rd e conomic growth . I w i l l  
demons tra te tha t the Government ha s overlooked s ome fa ctors , such a s  
fore ign inves tment infl ow , wh ich a re important de t e rmina nts o f  eco ­
nomic growth . The pr ima ry a im o f  this the s is  is t o  eva lua te the 
e conomi c impa c t  o f  American withdrawa l and to show tha t it will 
1sometimes called "rest a nd recreation." 
1 
2 
sub s tant ia l ly reduce economic growth . The the s is is  tes ted by 
s imp l e  regre s s ion ana lys is  us ing t ime s e r ies of the yea rs 1 955 to 
1 97 1 . 
The body o f  this thes is w i l l  be d ivided into  f ive pa rts . 
F i rs t ,  a his tory o f  American mil i ta ry build -up and de -e s ca l a t ion . 
In the s e c ond cha pter the d is cus s ion w il l  concentra te on American 
expend itures in Tha iland exc lud ing fore ign a id ,  for the re can be  
no  a na lys is of  the economic con s e quences o f  the American withdrawa l 
from Thail and w i thout es tabl ish ing the s iz e  o f  Ame rican  expenditure s .  
In the fo l l ow ing cha pter  I w i l l  cons ider the fore ign a s s is tance pro ­
gram o f  both economic and mil ita ry grants . The fourth cha p t e r  w i l l  
show s ome s e l e c ted effects  o f  American expenditures o n  the Tha i 
e conomy . The l a s t  cha pter wil l a na lyz e by regre s s ion a na lys is the 
e conomic imp a c t  o f  mil i ta ry build -up in S outhea s t  As ia ;  it is argued 
tha t  w ithdrawa l w i l l  a ffe c t  the economy in the oppo s it e  way tha t 
build -up d id .  
CHAPTER I 
THE AMERICAN MILITARY BUILD -UP AND THE DE -ES CALATION PROCES S 
Ame rican mil ita ry influence in Tha iland began in a sma ll way 
in 1 950 , when the United S ta tes wa s cons t ructing a " conta inment" wa l l  
a ga inst  the Communis t world , b y  means o f  a mil ita ry a s s is tance pro gram 
to Tha iland . A t  firs t , only a few Ameri can  mil it a ry p ers onnel went to 
Tha iland; they went to  tea ch the Tha i s o l d iers how to use  American 
weapons . In fa c t , in the ea rly s ixt ie s there w e re s t il l  only 300 . 
By mid -1 96 9 ,  on the o the r hand , the re were about 48 , 000 United S tates 
mil ita ry personnel in Thailand, mos tly A ir Force pers onnel us ing Tha i 
bases  to bomb t a rgets  in Vietnam a nd L a o s . 2 
With the pers onnel came e conomic a id .  F rom 1 949 to  1 96 9 ,  the 
United S ta te s  provided Tha iland w i th $ 2 . 2 b il l ion in e conomic a nd 
mil ita ry a s s i s tance a nd inves te d  $ 7 0 2  mill ion in cons t ruc t ion o f  
·1 · b 3 mi ita ry a s e s . How a nd why th is  tremendous build -up came about i s  
an  intere s t ing p rogre s s ion o f  d ipl oma t ic and mil ita ry event s . 
In 1 954 the Geneva A ccords were s igned end ing the Indo china 
Wa r .  The Tha is were a s  skept ica l a bout the effec t ivene s s  o f  tho s e 
accords a s  wa s the S e creta ry o f  S ta te ,  John Fos t e r  Dul les, who p ro -
ceeded to d ra ft  the S outhea s t  A s ia n  Co l l e c t ive Defens e T rea ty 
2 . New York Times , June 8 ,  1 97 0 . 
3 
Ibid. ,  June 14 , 1 9 7 0. 
3 
4 
Organiz a t ion (SEATO) embra cing the United S tates , Tha il a nd and s ix 
o the r countrie s . Unde r  the t reaty , the s igna tories  agreed to  mee t  
the "common danger" f o r  a rmed a t ta ck o n  one o f  the memb e rs through 
the ir respect ive cons titut iona l p ro ces s e s . 4 
In 1 96 2  when the Communi s t s  were threa tening in ne ighbo ring 
Laos , Tha iland be came jittery about the SEATO commitment a nd s ought 
new America n  a s s urance s . Thes e a s s urances were g iven by S e c reta ry 
o f  S ta t e  Dean Rusk  who , in a j o int communique with the Tha i Fore i gn 
Minis ter , Thanat Khoman , s a id tha t the United  S ta te s  d id no t inter -
p re t  its S EATO trea ty obl igat ion to  depend upon app rova l o f  a l l  
S EATO memb e rs , s ince " this t rea ty obl iga t ion i s  ind ividua l a s  we l l  
a s  col l e c t ive . 115 Both Tha iland a nd the United S ta tes  a greed tha t 
S EATO wa s an ineffect ive organiz a t ion . In Ma rch o f  tha t yea r 
Dean Rus k  a nd Thana t Khoma n i s s ued a j o int memo randum tha t be came 
the b as is o f  the Wa shington -Ba ngkok a ll iance . A ppa rently , few 
members o f  the United S ta te s  Congres s  were awa re o f  the document , 
a l though i t  is  the subj e c t  o f  a S t a te Depa rtment pre s s  relea s e  
da ted Ma rch 6 ,  1 96 2 . 6 The word ing is  mo re amb iguous than tha t o f  
mos t  such documents , ye t the memo randum clea rly s t a te s  the fo l l ow in g :  
( 1 ) A rt icle  II  o f  the SEATO trea ty a l l ows the United 
S t a t e s  a nd Tha iland t o  ma ke a b il a t e ra l  a greement 
tha t wil l then become b inding upon a l l  members o f  
the t reaty organiza t ion . 
4
L ouis E .  Lomax , Tha il a nd : The Wa r Tha t I s , The Wa r That 
Wil l Be (New Yo rk : Vinta ge Books , 1 967) , p .  151. 
5New York T imes , June 14 , 1 9 7 0 . 
6Louis  E. Lomax , .2..E.· c it . ,  p. 15 3 .  
5 
( 2) The two government s w i l l  ma ke wha tever private 
pacts  tha t a re nece s s a ry in o rder to  s t o p  
Communi s t  aggre s s ion . This a greement i s  
j us t i f ied under A r t i c l e  I V  o f  the SEATO t rea ty . 
(3) The United S t a tes  w i l l  de fend Tha iland a ga ins t 
d irec t  or  ind ire ct  a ggres s .ion . 7 
In  1 964 a s  the s itua t ion in Vietnam and L a o s  cont inued to 
deterio ra te , the United S tates and Tha iland began dra ft in g  a b i -
l a te ra l  mil ita ry cont ingency plan . The s t il l  s e cret  plan , which 
appa rently included p rovis ion o f  Ame r ican ground t roops , wa s f ina l ly 
s igned in 1 9 6 6 , two yea rs after the United S t a te s  ha d begun bombing 
North Vietnam and northern Laos  from Tha i ba ses .
8 
In 1 9 6 6  the United S ta tes  mil ita ry al s o  awa rded a n  exclus ive 
con tract to the Expres s  Trans port  O rgan iz a t ion ( ETO) , a government -
owned t rucking co rpora t ion run by the Tha i Minis t e r  o f  Communica t ions , 
9 
t o  ca rry American mil ita ry supp l ies  w ithin Thailand . S igning the 
contra c t  wa s a resul t o f  the dec i s ion by the Uni ted S ta tes  to e s ca l a te 
the wa r in Vietnam , and e s ca l a t ion re quired mo re permanent a rrangements 
in Tha iland tha n  p revious ly. 
In 1 96 7  B -5 2  bombers were s ta t ioned in Tha i l a nd fo r bomb ing 
V ietnam . Mo reover , Tha iland became an a l ly o f  the United S t a tes  in 
the Vietnam Wa r when an a greement wa s rea che d  be tween the two govern -
ment s  on sending the Tha i " B l a ck P a nthers" d ivis ion to  South Vietnam . 
7 s e e  A p pendix A ,  The Rus k -Thana t Memorandum . 
8 
N ew Yo rk T ime s , June 14 , 1 9 7 0 . 
9Ibid . 
6 
In September of that year, 2,200 Thai soldiers were sent to South 
Vietnam.10 
The Thais became concerned that the dispatch of the force 
to Vietnam might weaken their security position at home. To avoid 
this consequence, the United States agreed to provide an additional 
million dollars in military assistance. Washington also agreed to 
provide Thailand a set of Hawk anti-aircraft missiles, some radar-
detector anti-aircraft guns, as well as to formalize arrangements 
11 
for a joint air defense system. 
In order to relieve the financial burden of sending Thai 
troops to Vietnam, the United States agreed to pay about 50 million 
dollars a year in overseas allowances, entertainment expenses, 
logistics support, mustering-out and death benefits to the Thai 
troops. The pattern is not unique with Thailand. In varying forms, 
a similar arrangement was made for South Korea and the Philippines--
both of which received American subsidies for sending troops to 
. 12 Vietnam. 
As stated above, in 1969 there were about 48,000 American 
servicemen stationed in Thailand as a result of the war in Vietnam. 
About 36,000 were Air Force personnel operating at six bases; initi-
ally their attention was directed toward enemy forces in North Vietnam 
and Laos but in 1972 toward enemy forces in South Vietnam and Laos. 
lOFar Eastern Economic Review, August 28, 1969, p. 520. 




The rest were army troops who provided logistical support for the 
Air Force. Finally, about 1, 200 Americans are in Thailand to give 
training and assistance to the Thai armed forces fighting insurgents. 
About 1, 000 are military advisors. 
In August, 1969 the United States and Thailand agreed to 
begin talks on reducing the 49, 000-man American force in Thailand. 
Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman said that Thailand would like 
to withdraw her 12, 000 combat troops from South Vietnam because of 
the burdens she faced at home. He said the withdrawal of 49, 000 
United States troops, mostly airmen, from Thailand would not affect 
the security of Thailand because the troops were stationed there in 
connection with the war in South Vietnam and Laos. 13 Perplexingly, 
in the following month, foreign ministers of five allied governments 
(Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand and South Korea) 
said that their troop strength in Vietnam would be maintained at 
present levels despite President Nixon's decision to withdraw about 
60, 000 American troops. The five nations have a total of more than 
70, 000 men in South Vietnam. 14 
In October, 1969 the United States and Thailand announced 
plans to withdraw 6, 000 American Air Force and Army troops from 
Thailand in the next ten months. 15 The United States closed the 
13Ibid., August 2, 1969. 
14Ibid., September 21, 1969. 
15Ibid. , October 1, 1969. 
8 
big fighter-bomber base at Takhli, 80 miles north of Bangkok, and 
16 
withdrew up to 5, 000 men. At the same time, Thailand began nego-
tiations with the Saigon Government for the withdrawal of the 12,000 
Thai combat troops serving in South Vietnam because she wanted to 
bring the troops back to Thailand to reinforce provinces on the 
border of Cambodia and Laos.17 The Americans withdrew 6,000 men 
from Thailand under its first phase in July, 1970. Under a second 
phase, about 3,600 of 42,000 American troops stationed in Thailand 
were withdrawn beginning on September 8, 1970. 18 The United States 
goal was to cut back to 32, 000 military personnel by July 1, 1971.
19 
Again, for the sake of Thailand's security, Secretary of 
State William P .  Rogers said the United States would not give up its 
bases in neighboring Thailand.20 Nevertheless, the United States 
forces were reduced to 31,000 in March, 1972. Of the 31, 000, 24, 000 
were Air Force personnel who were involved in the air war over Indo-
china from Thai bases. In addition, the figure includes 300 men in 
the Navy and Marines and 4,500 Army troops, of whom roughly half were 
involved in logistic and supply operations; the other half were used 
to man the communications network and post exchanges and to make up 
advisory and training teams. There were 1,880 American civilians 
working directly for the United States Government mission in Thailand. 
16Ibid., August 23, 1970. 
17
Ibid., August 27' 1970. 
18 
Ibid., November 7, 1970. 
19 
Ibid., January 17, 1970. 
20ibid., January 28' 1971. 
9 
These include 160 from the State Department and United States 
Information Services (USIS), 250 with the foreign aid mission, 
280 with the Peace Corps (PC), 30 in various small jobs and 1,160 
working with the military, about half of the last figure being 
under contract with the Department of Defense.21 
There are some signs of an increase in personnel since that 
time, however, for Takhli Air Base, which was closed in October, 
1970, re-opened again at the beginning of May, 1972; 22 and Nam Phong, 
the seventh base in Thailand, opened in June, 1972. These changes 
bring the troop strength up to 45 , 000  again. :CJ!Owever, with peace 
imminent, bombing of Vietnam may be discontinued with further 
reductions of American personnel in Thailand. 
As the United States leaves Vietnam, there occurs a build-up 
of American forces in Thailand. The president's press secretary, 
Mr. Ronald L .  Ziegler, was asked at his morning briefing on June 28, 
1972, whether some of the 1 0 , 000 troops involved in an announcement 
of withdrawal would simply be transferred to Thailand, or elsewhere. 
He said such transfers would involve a "miniscule number.1123 Despite 
this statement, the combined strength of navy, air force and marine 
personnel in and off-shore Thailand in 1972 was at its highest level 
since its peak in 1968.24 Although there was a build-up in Thailand, 
it was far less than the number of personnel released from Vietnam. 
21
�., March 23, 1972. 
22Ibid., May 7, 1972. 
23rbid., June 29, 1972. 
24Ibi'd., M 9 1972 ay ' . . (See Figure 2) 
10 
According to the statistics provided by the Defense Depart-
ment in August, 1972, there were 45, 000 Americans representing the 
armed services in Thailand. About 39, 000 are airmen, 2, 000 marines 
and 4, 000 soldiers running the American-built military seaport at 
Sattahip, operating a nationwide network of communication stations, 
d d. . ·1· . . 25 an irecting mi itary training programs. (See Figures 1, 2 and 3) 
For the de-escalation process, at the present time, there is 
no definite schedule. The National Security Council and the Economic 
Planning Division of the Ministry of Development of Thailand have 
made some assumptions concerning de-escalation. 26 The assumptions are: 
(1) The United States will start serious de-escalation 
from Vietnam in early 1970 by withdrawing about 
200, 000 men per year in 1970 and 1971. At the end 
of 1971, there will be only about 100, 000 United 
States troops in Vietnam. (In fact, it started in 
late 1969,) 
(2) The American military presence in Thailand will 
also be reduced during 1970 and 1971. The rate 
of reduction will be about 33 percent per year; 
that is, from about 50,000 servicemen in 1969 to 
about 33, 000 and 22, 000 servicemen in 1970 and 
1971. 
(3) Using assumptions 1 and 2, the Thai government 
estimated that American military expenditures 
25 
in Thailand would be reduced from $151 million 
in 1969 to about $110 million in 1970 and $75 
million in 1971. The expenditures of the American 
military personnel on rest and recuperation (R and R) 
are estimated to fall from $20 million in 1969 to 
$13. 5  million in 1970 and $9. 5 million in 1971. 
This estimation is based on the assumption that 
the American soldiers on R and R each year will 
amount to about 10 percent of the American sol­
diers stationed in Vietnam. 
U.S. News & World Report, August 21, 1972. 
26unpublished Report of the National Economic Planning Board 
to the Cabinet, 1969, in Thai, pp. 2-3 .  
11 
FIGURE 1 
AMERICAN BASES IN THAILAND 
r��=���:.:� �,J�;·.v;�% 
�j; ARE BASED IN THAILAND t-? M' 
AIR FORCE: 39,000 airmen, manning 11 fighter· 
bomber squadrons and 50 to 100 B-52s at six air bases. 
MARINES: 2,000 manning three fighter-bomber squad· 
rons at Nam Phong air base. 
ARMY: 4,000 men-running the American-built military 
seaport at Sattahip, operating a nationwide network of com­
munications stations, directing military-training programs 
throughout the countryside. 
Source: U.S. News & World Report, August 21, 1972. 
12 
FIGURE 2 
AMERICAN TROOPS IN THAILAND 
While V. S. Strength Dwindles in Vietnam-






U.S. Military Forces in Thailand 
, Jn April, 1969, ·l 
1543,400 in Vietnamj �-- ·� 
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 Latest · · 
(Aug., 1972) Source: U.S. Dept. of Defense 
.. :: .:) ·, ' , ' �,;.',,..�,.; 










AMERICAN TROOPS IN SOUTH VIETNAM AND THAILAND , 
� 
543,000 
Troop strength in Vietnam 
Troop strength in Thailand 39, 000 by September 
r-------------------;,;:----
1969 1970 1971 1972 
Source: New York Times, June 29, 1972. 
14 
Thes e a s sump t ions were s e t  up s ome t ime in July , 1 9 6 9 . When 
they were made, however ,  there wa s diplomat ic tens ion between the 
Uni t ed S ta tes  a nd Tha il and . The American S ena te ,  fea r ing tha t the 
count ry might be drawn into a nother wa r in S outhea s t  A s ia , moved  to 
inve s t iga te  rel a t ions between the United S ta te s  and Tha iland . 27 In 
the inve s t iga t ion , the S ena te po inted out tha t Congre s s  had not been 
informed about the cont ingency p l a n  made in 1965  between the two 
countrie s . Dur ing the controversy , the S e creta ry o f  Defens e talked 
as  if he ha d repud iated the s e cret p la n . The whol e  controversy 
irrita ted the Tha is , s o  the Tha i Government moved in A ugus t , 1 9 6 9  
to  pro po s e  a t a l k  o n  the reduc t ion o f  United S t a tes  forces in 
Tha iland . 2 8  Dur ing tha t t ime , there were a l s o s ta tements from high-
ranking Tha i o f f i c ia l s  sugge s t ing the w ithdrawa l o f  the Tha i forces 
2 9  
from Vietnam . The Tha i Ca b inet o rdered the S e curity Council and 
the Na t iona l Economic Deve l opment Boa rd (NEDB) t o  s tudy the impa cts  
of  withdrawa l b e fore  the Cab ine t p rop o s ed the ta l ks on the reduction 
of  the United S ta te s  force s . Since both count ries  were thinking in 
t e rms o f  withdrawa l ,  the a s s umpt ions conce rn ing future Ame rican 
expend itures were p es s imis t i c  a nd grea tly unde res t ima ted a ctua l 
expenditures . Tabl e 1 shows the differences  b e tween the p redict ion 
a nd the a ctua l expend itures resul t ing from United S ta tes  p res ence in 
Tha il and dur ing the s e  yea rs . 
27 
New York Time s , June 2 5 , 1 96 9 . 
2 8� . ,  A ugus t  23 , 1 96 9 . 
2 9rb id . , Augus t 2, 1 96 9 . 
15 
TABLE 1 
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND R AND R EXPENDITURES IN THAILAND 




S ecur ity Counc il  and NEDB Predict ion 
355 6.8 
2568 . 8  
17 5 7.6 
A ctua l 
5 7 46 . 9  
5234 . 8  
47 53 . 2 
S ource: Unpub lished Repo rt of the Na t iona l Economic 
Plann ing Bo a rd to the Ca b inet , 196 9 and Bank o f  Tha iland . 
a Converted to  dol la rs us ing the o f f i c ia l  ra te o f  exchange 
for 197 2 . 
The mil it a ry buil d-up wa s s ta rted  under United S ta tes initi-
a t ive b e caus e the Connnunis t s  wou l d  be s trengthened if they were to 
ga in a c ces s  to  the a bundant resources of S outhea s t  A s ia including 
many minera l s ,  petroleum, foods tuffs  and manp ower, among others . I f 
Southea s t  A s ia were to  b e  l o s t  to  the Communi s t s ,  i t  woul d  mean  more 
than 300 mil l ion people  a dded in A s ia to  the 800 mil l ion of China. 
Fea rs of such a hegemony by the Communi s t s  caus ed the Uriited S ta tes  
to  begin mil ita ry build-up for  he r own interes t s . 30 
The de-es cala t ion is quite  different from the mil ita ry bui l d-
up . Becau s e  o f  interna l p re s sure" the United  S t a t e s  ha s s ta rted to  
withdraw troops  from Vietnam . The  Tha i Government fel t tha t mis con-
cept ions were s prea d by the news media and congres s men in the Uni t ed 
3°Fo re ign A ffa irs Bul l e t in ,  Vol . VII , No . 5 ,  A pril-May 1 9 6 8 , 
Minis t ry o f  Fore ign A f fa irs , Ba ngkok , Tha i land , p .  457 . 
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conce rning the future of Communism in Tha iland a nd the rol e  o f  
Amer ican fo rces with in the count ry . A s  ment ioned a bove , mis con-
cep t ions s o  irrita ted the Tha is  tha t the government in Augus t  196 9 , 
reques ted a t a l k  on the reduct ion o f  America n  force s in Th ailand . 31 
This wa s exp la ined by the Tha i F o r e i gn Minis ter Thana t Khoman in 
the a ddre s s  g iven to a s tudent group from the United S ta tes  Na t iona l 
Wa r Col l e ge on A p r il 1$, 19 6 9 :  
·· . . . We hope tha t you w i l l  get f irs t-hand a c count s o f  
many things you may have hea rd o f  o r  rea d a bout when 
you were at home . There is no thing , in our opinion , 
better  than a firs t-hand report. A t  l ea s t  two o r  
three myths have been l a unched a bout Tha iland . The 
f irs t one is  tha t Tha i l a nd wil l be the next Vietnam . 
Tha t ha s b e en the theme o f  many wes tern reporte rs . 
The imp l ica t ion is tha t the U . S . ha d better  get out 
of Vietnam s oon , for even though the Vietnam Wa r may 
be s olved , s o oner o r  l a t e r  there is go ing to  b e  a no ther 
one . But I can a s sure you tha t Tha iland w i l l  no t b e  
a no ther Vietnam , b e cause  w e  a re no t go ing to  r e l y  a s  
heavily o n  a nybody but ours e lve s . In fa ct , wha t w e  
have b e en t rying to  d o  a l l  this t ime is  to prevent 
tha t myth from becoming a rea l ity. The s e cond "myth" 
is tha t the American a rmed for c e s  a re used for  the 
de fens e o f  Tha il a nd a ga ins t the Communis t s . This is  
to tal ly unfounded , b e caus e there is  no phys ica l  enga ge­
ment on the part  of the U . S . forces a ga ins t communis t 
a ct ivities  in Tha iland . They a re here only for the 
purpo s e,of carrying out the wa r in Vietnam from here . 
S o  p l ea s e  che ck with the authorities here whe the r wha t 
I s a id is  t rue o r  no t . The th i rd "myth" tha t ha s been 
launched a ga ins t us is tha t we a re the p rime bene f i c ia ry 
o f  the wa r .  Th is a ga in is fa l s e  b ecaus e , apa rt  from the 
U . S . industry , Japan , Korea , Hong Kong a nd S inga pore a re 
the ma j or b ene f i c ia rie s . I think Tha iland come s about 
l a s t. No doubt many mil l ions of dol l a rs have b e en s p ent 
here on such things a s  the va rious mil itary ba s es , but I 
w i l l  humbly s a y  tha t the purpo s e  of the U . S . in build ing 
31 
N ew Yo rk T imes , A ugus t 2 3 ,  19 6 9 . 
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ba s e s  here was  to fa c il ita te i t s  wa r ope ra t ions .  
S o  I think tha t mil l ions o f  do l l a rs s pent here 
have no doubt s aved thousands of l ive s.32 
Thana t Khoman a l s o  made i t  clea r when he gave a s pe e ch to 
members of the fore ign corres pondent s ' club of Tha iland in Bangkok 
on Augus t 19 , 196 9 ,  tha t :  
O f  cours e ,  they (American p eop l e) ha ve the right 
not to  bel ieve our s a y ing tha t we do no t want to  
invo lve American forces . They have the right not 
to bel ieve me or o thers when we say  tha t we have 
not a s ked nor will  we a sk for America n  forces to 
f i ght a ga ins t communi s t  subvers ion in Tha iland . 
S o , the b es t  way for them t o  prevent such involve­
ment would b e  to take the American forces out o f  
Tha iland a s  qui ckly a s  pos s ib l e . Then they coul d 
s e e  whe ther·or·not the Tha i people  wou l d  ra ise  a 
hue a nd cry ,  and oppo s e  such eva cua t ion and with ­
drawa l • . • •  We in Tha iland can begin d i s cu s s ions 
w i th the U . S . autho r it ie s  for an ea rly withdrawa l 
o f  such forces in o rder to  ca lm the fea rs o f  certa in 
American p o l i t i c ians and memb e rs o f  the p re s s  tha t 
the United  S ta tes may b e come emb ro i l e d  and inv9lved 
in fight ing int erna l subvers ion in Tha iland . 33:. 
S o  de-e s ca l a t ion o f  the American fo rces in Tha iland wa s encouraged 
by Tha i l a nd . It b�gan in Augus t ,  19 6 9 . 34 
A fter  a careful s tudy , I woul d l ike to express  the follow ing 
viewpo int: 
(1) A t  the pres ent , there a re evidences show ing tha t it is 
unl ikely tha t the United S t a tes  w i l l  withdraw the force s dra s t i ca l ly ,  
due t o  United S ta tes  inte re s t  in S outhea s t  A s ia . S ince interna l 
3 2F o re ign A ffa irs Bul l e t in ,  Vo l . VIII, No . 5 ,  A pril -May 196 9 ,  
Minis t ry o f  Fore ign A.ffa irs , Bangkok , Tha iland, p .  318 . 
33 . . For eign A f fairs Bul l e t in, Vol . IX , No . 1 ,  Augus t -S eptember 
196 9 ,  Minis try of Fo re ign A ffa irs , Bangkok , Tha il and , p .  6 .  
34 
See App end ix B and C .  
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p re s s ure fo rced Pres ident N ixon to withdraw American fo rces  from 
S outh Vietna m ,  the United S ta te s  had to f ind ano ther b a s e  qui ckly 
for her air powe r . A s enio r Ame r i ca n  o fficer  s a id ,  
The fa c t  is  we c ould not have kept Sa igon from 
go ing down the d ra in and cont inued to w ithdraw 
our forces  from Vietnam w i thout the a s s is tance . 
o f  Tha iland . There wa s jus t  no pla ce e l s e  to go . 35 
Figure 2 shows the trend o f  the t roop l eve l in Tha iland , wh ile 
United S t a tes  forces  dw indl e  in Vietnam . F rom 1 97 1  to Augus t ,  1 9 7 2 , 
the t roop l evel increa ses  from about 32 , 00 0  to 45 , 00 0 . S ome United 
S tates  forces , wh ich were withdrawn from Vietna m ,  were d irectly t ra ns ­
ferred to s ta t ions in Tha il and . 36 
. 
( 2) Pres ident Nixon confirmed tha t the United S ta tes  would 
hel p pro t e c t  Tha iland from exte rna l a ggre s s ors . Wh ile  he wa s vis i t ing 
Bangkok on July 28, 1 96 9 ,  he gave a res pons e to the Key to the C ity 
Pre s enta t ion as fol l ows : 
And tha t l eads me t o  s a y  tha t everyone knows tha t 
Thailand a nd the United S ta te s  a re s igna tories  o f  that 
t re a ty . (S EATO) We a re bound to ge ther  by tha t t rea ty . 
Now, a t rea ty ca n have ma ny mea nings:  I t  ca n be j us t  
a s o rt o f  pap e r , with no meaning a t  a l l . But a s  fa r 
as Tha i l and and the United S ta te s  is  concerned , a 
trea ty means fa r more . Because  we sha re common idea l s ,  
b e cause  wha t we want for A s ia and the world  is the right 
of freedom which Tha iland enj oys fo r a l l  peoples  here , 
becau s e  we have been w i l l ing to fight for  tha t a s  we a re 
figh t ing for tha t togethe r in Vietna m ,  b e ca u s e  o f  thes e  
deep s p iritua l and ideol o g i ca l  t ie s  tha t b ind us , the 
35 
36 
U . S . N ews & World Report , Augu s t  21 , 1 97 2 , p .  30 . 
New Yo rk T imes , June 2 9 , 197 2 . 
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trea ty tha t we have with Tha il and means tha t it is  
not j us t  another  t reaty , not just  anothe r p iece  o f  
p aper , but i t  i s  one tha t  ha s a s ignif ica nce fa r 
b eyond tha t- -a s ignificance  wh ich I have ind ica ted 
t ime and a ga in in pub l i c  s t a tements , a nd I ind i ca te 
t oday in my first  pub l i c  s t a tement as  I vis it Bangkok 
a nd this country. 
We w i l l  honor our obliga t ions under tha t t rea ty . We 
w il l  honor them not s imp ly  b e caus e we have to , b e ca us e  
o f  words tha t w e  have s igned , but be cau s e  we bel ieve 
in thos e  words , a nd pa rt icul a rly bel ieve in them in 
the a s so c ia t ion tha t we have w ith a p roud and a s t rong 
peopl e , the peopl e o f  Tha iland . We have b e en together 
in the pa s t , we a re together at the p re s ent , and the 
United S ta tes  wil l s ta nd p roudly w ith Tha iland a ga ins t . 
thos e who might threa ten i t  from abroa d ,  o r  from within.37 
This convinces me tha t the United S ta te s  wil l do everything 
it can in order to  p ro tect  Tha il and from a ggre s s ors . It implies 
tha t in order t o  p rote ct  Tha il a nd , the United S ta tes  shoul d have 
s ome troops there for four yea rs mo re  a t  l ea s t . S e cre tary of S ta t e , 
Will iam P .  Rogers , confirmed th is  p o s it ion in 197 2 by s aying the 
38 
United S ta tes  woul d not g ive up its b a s e s  in " ne ighboring" Tha iland . 
( 3) A dmiral J ohn S .  McCa in expres s ed wha t s e ems to be a common 
mil it a ry idea , tha t it is  s t il l  a dvis a b l e  for the United S ta te s  to u s e  
the ba s e s  i n  Thailand , becaus e an  end to  the wa r b e tween No rth and 
S outh Vietnam i s  not go ing to  be the end o f  f ight ing in the res t  o f  
S outhea s t  As ia . Tha i l a nd i s  the key t o  the ent ire a rea . I f  Tha iland 
fa l l s , the Communi s t s  could take a l l  o f  the S outhea s t  A s ian Peninsula . 
He a ls o  reminded us  tha t the Rus s ians a re  buil d ing up their  fl e e t s  in 
3 7Fore ign A ffa irs Bul l e t in , Vol. VIII , No. 6 ,  June-July 196 9 , 
Minis try o f  Fore ign A ffa irs , Ba ngkok , Tha iland , p .  434 . 
38New York T imes , Ja nua ry 2 8 , 1 97 2. 
20 
the Pa c i f i c  and Ind ian Oceans , and a re deve l o p ing ba ses  a nd ancho ra ges 
3 9 
in many p l a ce s . 
The United S ta te s  mil ita ry planners p robably  a re l ooking for 
a s tra tegic  nava l b a s e  in S outhea s t  A s ia in o rder  t o  " keep up" w i th 
the Rus s ians . 40 S a ttahip , in Tha iland , may be  cho s en b e cause  o f  the 
f o l l ow ing rea s ons : 
( 1) S a t tahip ha s a s tra tegic  l o ca t ion w ith res pe c t  to 
S outhea s t  A s ia and is  owned by Tha iland , a s t rong 
and dependable  Amer ican a l ly . 
(2) S a t t ahip Ha rbo r  is  a lmos t  ent irely the crea t ion o f  
Uni t ed S ta tes  A rmy Engineers . The nava l fa c i l i t ies  
at  S a t tah ip make it a firs t-ra t e  ba s e  in S outhea s t  
A s ia tha t coul d ea s ily b e  the ba s e  o f  opera t ions 
for an ent ire fleet . 
(3) S eventh Fleet  wa rships  opera t ing out o f  S a t tahip 
would b e  in pos it ion t o  counter quickly Rus s ia ' s 
determined b id t o  expand its autho rity in the 
·region . 
(4) B e cause  o f  United S ta tes  withdrawa l from S outh 
Vietna m ,  the S eventh Fleet cannot us e it a s  a ba s e . 
The Phil ipp ines have ma de i t  cl e a r  tha t they do not 
want American p lanes fly ing comb a t  mis s ions from 
ba s es there. Ma lays ia is  p rea ching neutra l is m .  
S ingapore , too , would b e  out . So Tha iland wil l 
be the mo s t  l ike ly p l a ce . 
I f  S a t tahip is  re ques ted by the United S ta te s  for u s e  a s  a 
nava l ba s e , the dra s ti c  withdrawa l w i l l  not o c cur . I n  fa ct , i f  de-
es ca l a t ion o c curs , the p roces s  w i l l  b e  s l ow a nd the number o f  t roops  
cut w il l  be  sma l l . Indeed , there is  a l s o  a po s s ibil i ty tha t ,  ins tead 
of  de -es ca l a t ion , there might be  a n  e s ca l a t ion in the nea r future . 
39 
U. S • .  News & World Repo rt , October 23 , 1 97 2 , pp . 30- 32 . 
40Ib id . , p .  32 . 
CHAPTER II 
AMERICAN EXPENDITURES IN THAILAND EXCLUDING FOREIGN AID 
American expenditures in Tha iland tha t result either 
d irectly o r  ind irectly  from the communis t threa t in S outhea s t  A s ia 
may b e  cla s s i fied a s  fore ign a id expenditures  o r  expend iture s other 
than fo re ign a id .  This  cha pter  will concentra te  only on the American 
expenditures in Tha iland excluding fo re ign a id ;  the fo l l ow ing cha pter  
wil l d is cu s s  fore ign a id expendi ture s . 
American expend itures in Tha iland exclud ing fore ign a id can 
be  cla s s i f ied into two ca tegories:  Non-mil ita ry expend iture s in 
Tha iland and d irect and ind irec t  mil ita ry expend iture s . 
Non -Mil it a ry Expenditures in Tha iland 
This ca tego ry cons i s t s  o f  expenditure s o f  Ame rican c itiz ens 
a nd emp loyees  of the United S ta te s  gove rnment exclud ing trave l l ers and 
mil itary . Tab l e s  2 a nd 3 show the numbe r  o f  Amer ican emp l oyees  o f  
c ivil ian a genci e s  in Tha iland and the amount o f  money s pent in 1 9 6 6  
to  1 96 9  a nd 1 9 6 6  t o  1 968  re s pe c t ively . 
Unfo rtuna tely , the da ta for more recent yea rs  is  not ava il­
a b l e . However ,  th is  typ e  of expend iture ca n be  a ssumed to be at the 
l evel from 1 97 0  to 1 9 7 2  without a gre a t  dea l of erro r . Though there 
may be  s ome cutba ck in the numbe r  of c ivil ian p e rs onnel , the number 
will be sma l l  a nd will no t lead to any s e rious de crea s e  in expenditures .  
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TABLE 2 
AMERICAN EMPLOYEES OF UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT CIVILIAN AGENCIES IN 
THAILAND (INCLUDING U . So EMBA S SY, USIS,a USOMb AND PCc STAFF) 
Number 
1 96 6  
57 1 
1 9 67 
6 6 5  
aUnited S ta te s  Informa t ion S ervice s . 
bUnited  S ta te s  Op era t ions Mis s ion . 
c 
P ea ce  Corps . 
1 96 8  1 96 9  
8 17 6 9 9  
Not e : Avera ge hous ing a l l owance i s  about $3 , 200 per  yea r  
and includes a llowances fo r e l e c t r i c i ty ,  ga s and wa te r . 
S ource : United S t a tes  Emb a s s y , Ma rch 5 ,  1 96 9 . 
TABLE 3 
EXP ENDITURES OF AMERICAN CITIZENS AND EMPLOYEES OF U . S. GOVERNMENT 
EXCLUDING TRAVELLERS AND MILITARY 
Expend iture s o f  America n  C i t izens 
a nd American Emp l oyees of United 
S ta tes  Government C ivil ian A genc ies  
(mil l ions o f  dol l a rs) 30 21  1 9  
Source : Depa rtment o f  Fis ca l  P o l i cy ,  Minis t ry o f  Finance , 
unpub l ished do cument in Tha i ,  1 96 9 . 
Direct and Ind'.i.rect  Mil ita ry Expenditures 
Direct and indirect  mil ita ry expend itures aris e f rom the 
p re s ence of American troops  and o ther mil ita ry pers onnel . 
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Ind irect  Milita ry Expenditure s 
Indire c t  mil ita ry expenditure s  a re ma de by American mil ita ry 
pers onnel fo r p rima rily consumer goods and s e rvices  while  they a re in 
Tha iland . A ccording to the s tudy o f  the Uni ted S ta te s  Emba s s y  in 
Bangkok , Tha iland , Ta b l e  4 g ives the proj e c t ion o f  mil ita ry expend i­
ture s in Tha iland covering the p eriod 1963 to 1970 . 41 
Ind irect milit a ry expendi ture s , o r  in o ther words , expend i-
tures by s ervicemen can be c la s s i fied into two types--expenditures 
by pers onnel s ta t ioned in Tha iland and expend itures by pers onnel 
s ta t ioned e l s ewhere but who are in Tha iland for res t  and re cupera t ion . 
F ir s t  is  the expendi ture s conne cted w ith the United S ta tes 
s e rvicemen s t a t ioned in Tha il and . Tab l e  4 shows that the expenditures 
o f  the American mil ita ry personnel were $ 2 9  million in 1966 , $50 million 
in 1967 , $ 6 2  million in 1968 , $ 64 million in 1 9 6 9  a nd $ 64 mill ion a ga in 
in 197 0 . S ince American milita ry men s ta t i oned in Thailand s ta yed 
mos t ly on the b a s es , the ma jor geogra phi c  imp a ct  of expenditures will 
b e  on the e conomy in the a rea s a round the b a s es. A· United S t a tes  
Emba s s y  field  res ea rch paper  shows tha t  about  one-ha l f  o f  the American 
milita ry man ' s s ala ry is s pent on goods  and s e rvices  in Tha iland : 
food , recrea t ion , travel and dome s t i c  goods . 42 Th is  expenditure ha s 
41
I t  should b e  s tres s ed tha t the s e  figure s show net mil ita ry 
s p ending in the Tha i economy . They d i ffer  from United  S t a tes  Depa rtment 
o f  Defens e da ta  in de f init ion , s ince the Depa rtment o f  Defense include s  
all non-dolla r purcha s e s  fo r American fo rces  i n  Tha ila nd , wherea s these 
f igures include only the baht exp enditures in Tha i l a nd . 
42Bank of 'Thail and , C l a s s i fi ca t ions o f  the United S ta tes  
Expend itures in Tha il and by Level o f  S igni f i cance , unpubl ished do cu­
ment in Tha i ,  196 9 ,  p .  2 . 
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TABLE 4 
ESTIMATES OF NET UNITED STATES MILITARY AND RELATED SPENDING 
IN THE ECONOMY OF THAILAND 1966-197 0 
(baht converted t o  mil l ions o f  dol l a rs) 
( ca l enda r yea rs) 
I ll us t ra t ive 
Pha s edown o f  
196 6 1967  19 6 8  196 9  1970  One -Th ird 
United S t a tes  Mili -
ta ry Pers onnel 3 9  6 9  8 2  84 84 - 27 
(Of  which R and R) (10)  (19) ( 20 )  ( 20)  ( 20)  - 7 
Cons t ru ction (OICC) a 4 3 7 0 6 2  21 5 - 2 
Cons t ruct ion 
(Other Milita ry) 9 10 10 9 6 - 2 
POLb Dis t ribut ion 4 9 11 8 8 - 3 
Ma intenance , S upp lie s  
and S ervices  31 48 42 40 40 -13 
Mis cellaneous _!±_ __..§_ 8 8 8 - 3 
TOTAL 130 214 215 170 151 -57  
To ta l  Expenditures were $ 30 mil l ion in 19 6 3 ; 
$ 30 million in 1964 ; 
$ 5 0  mil l ion in 1965 . 
aO ff icer  in Cha rge o f  Cons t ruct ion . 
b 
Petro l eum - O i l  - Lub r i cants.  
S ource: U . S . Embas sy , Economic Impa c t  o f  a Pha s edown o f  
United S ta t es Mil ita ry S p ending in Thail and, Bangko k , May 196 9 ,  p .  2 .  
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crea ted a boom , e s pe c ia l ly in the enterta inment and hotel  bus ine s s  
nea r the ba s es a nd i n  Bangkok . 
S e condly , the expend itures o f  American s e rvicemen who a re 
s ta t ioned out s id e  o f  Thailand but who a re vis it ing Tha iland fo r 
res t  a nd recreation . Tab l e  4 shows tha t the expend itures in th is 
catego ry were $ 1 0  mill ion in 1 96 6; $ 1 9  mill ion in 1 9 67 ; and $ 2 0  
mil l ion each yea r  from 1 9 68  through 1 97 0 . The s e  f igure s a re very 
cons e rva t ive s ince the United S t a tes Embas s y  cal cul a ted them by 
as suming tha t the s o l d ie rs on res t a nd re crea t ion s pent , on the 
avera ge , f ive days in Tha iland a nd $50 p e r  day. A l though the 
American s o l d ie rs a re a l l owed to b r ing only $ 25 0  into the country , 
the regul a t ion is  ve ry d i f f i cul t to  enfo rce . There o c curs , there -
fore , expend itures by Ame rican s o l d iers who draw on the ir overseas  
43 
bank a ccounts by the use  o f  the l o cal  banking faci l it ies  in Ba ngkok . 
There a re two o ther es t ima tes  o f  s e rvice pers onnel expend i -
tures in Tha iland . The firs t , ma de b y  the Ford Founda t ion , a s s umes 
tha t ea ch Ame r ican s o l d ier  on R and R s p ends $ 60 per day for f ive 
44 
days . The s e cond e s t ima te , ma de by the Ba nk o f  Tha iland , a s s umes 
tha t ea ch American s o l d ier on R and R s p ends $ 65 p e r  day for s even 
45 
days . The re fore , the f igures in T a b l e  4 may be a s  much a s  
43 Herma nn Ha tz fe ldt , The Impa c t  o f  U . S. Mil ita ry Expend iture s 
on the Tha i Economy ,  Revised Dra ft , De cember , 1 96 8 , unpub l ished docu ­
ment , p .  2 .  
44 
!.ei4 ·  
45 Bank o f  Tha iland , 2.2.· c it . , p .  7 .  
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20 percent under the actual values. The impact of this expenditure 
is concentrated mostly in the Bangkok area. 
There is another type of expenditure which is an indirect 
military expenditure but does not appear in Table 4. It is the 
dollars earned by the Thai troops in Vietnam. The Thai troops, who 
served their duty in South Vietnam, are paid both by the Thai Govern-
ment and the United States Government. The Thai Government paid 
salaries of the troops to their wives in Thailand in baht. The 
United States Government paid overseas allowances to the Thai troops, 
mustering-out pay and death benefits, as well as entertainment funds 
for the Thai troops in Vietnam. The American-paid overseas allowance 
more than doubles the pay of the Thai troops in Vietnam. A Thai 
private who received a base pay of $26.a,month from the Thai Govern-
ment, for example, also received $39 in overseas allowances. A major 
with a base pay of $98 was given $180 in overseas allowances.4
6 
The State Department expressed some uncertainty over the exact 
cost of the American support to Thai forces in Vietnam. In a statement 
given to the subcommittee of the Senate, the State Department said: 
United States support to Thai forces in South Vietnam, 
when averaged over the years during which Thai forces 
have been deployed to South Vietnam, is estimated at 
approximately 50 million dollars a year. This would 
total 200 millio
R 
dollars for the period since their 
arrival in 1966. 7 
46 New York Times, June 8, 1970. 
47Ibid. 
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E conomic a l l y  spea king , a ny do l l a rs pa id to  the Tha i troops 
in Vietnam by the United S tates  Government , i f  the s e  funds a re 
t rans ferred to  Tha iland , have to  be  counted as export earnings . O f  
cours e ,  s ome o f  the p a y  given to  Tha i t roops in Vietnam flows b a ck 
into the Tha i e conomy when s o l d iers return with money saved in Viet ­
nam during the ir  one -yea r term .  The da ta o f  the to tal amount o f  
dol l a rs ea rned b y  the Tha i t roops in Vietnam , to tal amount o f  s pending 
there , and the tota l s avings cannot be  obta ined , and e s t imat ion o f  
this catego ry is  ha z a rdous . 
D i rect  Military Expend itures 
Direct mil i ta ry expend itures a re tho s e  ma de by the d i f ferent 
branches of the American a rmed forces  into the Tha i economy . 
F ir s t  i s  the cons truct ion expend itures .  In Tab l e  4 there are 
two types of cons truct ion expend iture s . The firs t ca tego ry (OICC) con ­
s is t s  o f  a ll expenditures for cons t ruct ion o f  mil ita ry ba s es . Th is 
type of expend iture rea ched a pea k in 1 96 7 , fe l l  a l it t l e  in 1 9 6 8  and 
then more sha rply in 1 9 6 9 , and f ina l ly dw indl ed  to a bout $5 mil l ion in 
1 97 0 . The s e cond ca tego ry consis t s  ma inly o f  expenditures for the con ­
s truc t ion o f  s tra tegic  roa ds , a nd it ha s the s a me t rend a s  the firs t  
catego ry . When the b a s e s  were planned ,  a certa in compl ement o f  roa ds 
a l so  were planned for logis t ic purpo s e s . Becaus e the roads a re ne ces ­
s ary fo r ba s e  opera t ion , unl e s s  the ba s e  is abandoned the roa ds w i l l  · 
be bu ilt  irre s p e c t ive o f  cond it ions in S outh Vietnam . Thus , expend i­
tures on road cons t ruct ion a re fixed fo r the future unl e s s  new ba s es 
a re buil t .  
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Cons t ruct ion expenditures a re ve ry important to  the Tha i 
economy ,  for l a rge a mounts o f  dome s t i c  ma teria l s  a nd l a rge numbers 
o f  both skilled a nd unskil l ed worke rs a re ut il ized . Th is type of 
expend iture a l s o  contributes to  e conomic development ind irectly by 
t ra ining the Tha is in cons t ruct ion skil ls . Unfo rtuna tely , the impa ct 
of such t ra ining on the ra t e  of growth is  d if ficul t ta e s t ima te . 
S e condly , there a re the expenditures ca tegoriz e d  a s  POL 
D i s t r ibut ion . Mos t  o f  the expend itures in this  ca tego ry a re for the 
d is tribu tion o f  fuel to American p l anes . Th is  type o f  expenditure 
depends on the l evel of mil i ta ry opera t ion in L a o s  and Vie tnam . 
A l though the United S t a t e s  ha s w ithdrawn s ome o f  the American s oldiers  
from Vietnam , th is type  o f  expend i ture is  no t fa l l ing ra p idly b e caus e , 
a s  withdrawa l o c curs e l s ewhere in S outhea s t  As ia , the numbe r  o f  Amer i ­
can planes in Tha il and i s  inc rea s ing . 
Ma intenance , sup p l ies and s e rvices is the third ca tego ry o f  
d ire c t  mil i ta ry expenditures . The l evel o f  expenditures in th is  
c a t egory depends on the a ct ivities  of  the American ba s es: S ince mo s t  
o f  the cons truct ion is  completed , ma intenance expend itures tend to 
rema in cons tant . As the United S ta te s  withdraws from Tha iland , th is  
type of  exp end iture will  cont inue t o  fa l l , part icul a rly if  the United 
S ta t e s  decides  not to ke ep a l l  of the s even ba s e s . 
The o ther direct  mil ita ry expend iture whi ch is no t included 
in Table  4 is  the conunodities  bought in Tha iland to s end to  Vietnam . 
This item is  very d i f ficul t to  determine . There a re only two records  
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o f  purcha s es o f  rice  and suga r by the American mil ita ry t o  s end t o  
S outh Vietnam in 1 96 6  and 1 96 7  a t  the tota l  amount o f  $ 2 3  mil l ion . 48 
There a re o ther unrecorded purcha ses , prima rily the cons t ruc t ion 
t imber to s end to  Vietnam. The r epo rt of the Survey o f  the Bank o f  
Tha iland s ta ted tha t the price o f  cons t ruct ion t imbe r  cont inues to  
r i s e , part ly b e caus e o f  the dema nd orig ina ted by  the cons t ru c t ion o f  
the American b a s e s , a nd a l s o  the United S ta tes milita ry purcha s e s  to  
d t V. t 4 9  s en o ie nam. I t  is my op inion tha t the tot a l  amount o f  this 
item is not s ignificant. 
48Bank o f  Tha il and , The E conomic Impa cts  of  the Vietnam Wa r to  
Tha iland , unpub l ished document in Tha i ,  1 96 9 ,  p. 9 .  
4 9Bank o f  Tha iland , Report : Field  Survey o f  the Impa cts  o f  the 
American Exp end itures on P rice s  a nd Wa ge s , Decemb e r  14 - 2 9 , 19 6 6 , p .  7 .  
CHAPTER III 
FOREIGN A S S I STANCE PROGRAM 
Expend itures o f  the United S ta tes  in Tha iland through th e 
Fore ign A s s is tance Pro gram a re shown in Tables  5 a nd 6 .  According 
t o  the da ta shown in Table  5 ,  the e conomic a s s is tance pro gram ca rried 
on by the A gency for Int ernat iona l Deve l opment (AID) 5 0  wa s about $50 
m i l l ion p e r  yea r in 196 6 and 1 96 7 . The program is counter - insurgency 
o r iented . Expend itures under thi s  economic a s s is tance program have a 
very high import ra t io. S eventy pe rcent o f  supp o rt ing a s s is tance 
expend itures a nd 2 8  percent o f  expend iture s for technica l coopera t ion 
a re imports  o f  commodities  from the United S ta tes .5 1  The impo rt 
expend iture does not a ffect the Tha i e conomy d irectly , except for the 
po rt ion o f  the expend itures pa id to  Tha is for handl ing . O f  cours e, 
the import s  thems elves are he l p ful to e conomic deve l opment. 
The Mil ita ry A s s istance P rogram (MAP) , wa s nea rly the same 
amount a s  AID expend itures in 1 9 6 6  and 1 96 7 . Thi s  p ro gram wa s 
50The A gency fo r Int e rna t iona l Deve l opment came into exis tence 
on November  4 , 1 9 6 1 , unde r  the provis ions of the Fo re ign A s s is tance 
A ct of 1 96 1 . The new a gency comb ined two a genc ie s wh ich ha d ex isted  
previous ly , the I nterna t iona l Coop era t ion A dmin i s t ra t ion and the 
Deve l opment Loan Fund , a s  we l l  a s  certa in other sma l ler units . 
5 1Na t iona l Economic Devel opment Boa rd , P l a nning fo r Pos t ­
Vietnam Period , unpub l ished do cument , 1 9 6 9 . 
30 
3 1  
TABLE 5 
u .s. OVERSEAS LOANS AND GRANTS 
(THAILAND) 
NET OBLIGATIONS AND LOAN AUTHORIZATIONS 
(U . S . FIS CAL YEARS -MILLIONS OF DOLLARS ) 
Tota l 
Tota l Economic Mil i ta ry Tota l  E conomic & Mi l it a ry 
Loa ns Grants  (Grants) Loans Gra nts 
1 946 -48 6 . 2 6 . 2 
194 9 -52  1 . 0 1 6 . 1  1 6 . 5  1 . 0 32 . 6  
1 95 3 -5 7  2 2.9 1 0 9 . 2  205 . 1  22 . 9  314 . 3  
1958 1 . 8 24 . 1  1 9 . 7  1 . 8 43 . 8  
1 95 9  34 . 7  24 . 2  1 8 . 0  34 . 7  42 . 2  
1 960  2 . 0 2 3 . 9  24 . 7  2 . 0 48 . 6  
1 961 24 . 3  2 3 . 9  48 . 2  
1 96 2  2 2 . 0  25 . 6  3 9 . 1  2 2 . 0  64 . 7  
1 96 3  4 . 9 17 . 0  6 8 . 5  4 . 9  8 5 . 5  
1 964 2 . 1 1 3 . 0  5 2 . 7  2 . 1 6 5 . 7  
1965  20 . 6  20 . 8  3 6 . 4  20 . 6  5 7 . 2  
1 96 6  14 . 9  45 . 5  40 . 7  14 . 9  8 6 . 2  
1 967  -1 3 . 5  5 0 . 5  46.9 - 1 3 . 5  97 . 2  
Tota l 
1946 -67  1 1 9  . 6  394 . 0  596 . 3  119 . 6  9 90 . 3  
Repayments 
& Intere s t 
1 946 -67  45 . 9  45 . 9  
Tota l Les s 
Repayment s 
& Interes t 7 3 . 7 3 94 . 0 5 96 . 3 7 3 . 7  9 90 . 3  
S ource : AID , U . S . Ove rs ea s Loans and Grants  and As s is tance 
from Interna t iona l O rganiza t ion , S p e c ia l  Report p repared for the House  
Fo re ign A ffa irs Committee , p .  7 3 . 
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es tab l ished to  modernize the Tha i a rmed forces.  The "Annua l Report  
to Congre s s , F i s c a l  Yea r 1 96 6" s ta tes : 
F is ca l 
Yea r  
1 96 6  
1 9 67  
1 968 
1 96 9 
1 970 
1 97 1  
F i s ca l  Yea r 1 9 6 6  mil ita ry a s s is tance fo r the o ther 
count ries whi ch rece ive g rant a id wa s d irected towa rd 
these obje c t ives :  
1 .  St rengthening the ca pabil ities  o f  s e l ected 
La t in Amer ican na t ions to ma inta in the interna l 
s e curity needed to rea l iz e  the goa l s  o f  the 
A l l iance for P r ogres s . 
2 .  P roviding U . S . support  to a l l ie d  and fr iendly 
na t ions tha t have g iven the United S t a te s  a ccess  
t o  s tra tegica l l y  vita l ba s es and  ins ta l l a t ions . 
3 .  Comp l e t ion of prior yea r corrnnitment s to countries 
whos e economic progre s s  now permit s  an increa s ingly 
ra p id pha s e -out o f  a l l  grant a id .  
4 .  Furnishing o f  mode s t  amount s  o f  a id to  count ries 
in which polit ica l ins ta b il ity and e conomic under­
deve l opment may b r ing Communis t a t temp t s  to  ga in 
domina t ion . 5 2  
TABLE 6 
DISTRIBUTION OF FIS CAL YEAR 1 96 6 -71 PROGRAM TO THAILAND 
BY TITLE AND FUNCTION ( thous ands  o f  dol la rs)  
T e chnical S upport ing Cantin . Devel . 
Tota l  Coo p e ra t ion A s s is tance Fund Loans MAP 
43 , 408  1 3 , 400 20 , 38 7  9 , 6 2 1  ";'c 
5 3 , 320 1 3 , 48 8  3 6 , 1 2 1  2 1 1  3 , 500 
4 6  '7 3 6  1 0 , 047 36 '696  
35 , 548 9 , 25 0  2 6 , 2 98 
2 6 , 545 6 , 388  1 8 , 8 6 2  1 ,  2 95 
2 2 , 541 4 , 1 50  1 6' 996  1 , 3 95 
*Da ta c las s ified; in cluded in the figure o f  the A rea Program . 
S ource : The Foreign A s s is tance P ro gram ,  Annua l Report to the 
Congre s s  F is ca l  Yea r 1 9 6 6 -7 1 . 
5 2The Fo re i gn A s s is tance P rogram,  Annual Report to  the Congre s s , 
F is ca l  Yea r  1 9 6 6  (Wa shington , D .  C.: Un ited S ta te s  Gove rnment Printing 
O f fice) , p. 30 . 
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T a b l e  6 shows tha t  the e conomi c a s s is tance rea che s a peak in 
1 96 7  and then s ta rts to de c l ine . Fo re ign a id fo r the fis ca l yea r 1 97 1  
is l e s s  than ha l f  o f  the figures in 1 96 7 . Thus , a s  the United Sta tes  
withdrew ra p idly from Vie tnam dur ing the a dminis t ra t ion o f  Pres ident 
N ixon , e c onomic a s s is tance went down qu ite ra p idly . In Augus t 1 96 9 ,  
the United S t a t e s  S ena te pla ced a $ 2 . 5  b il l ion c e il ing on the amount 
o f  money the United S ta tes could s p end to  support fo re ign t roops in 
Vie tnam , Laos  a nd Tha iland . 5 3  Moreove r , s ince the t o ta l  amount o f  
fore ign a id i s  be ing c u t  dra s t ica l ly b y  the American Congre s s , the 
e conomi c a s s is tance pro gram under  AID w il l  be a f fected , too . Thus , 
expend itures through the s e  two p ro grams ma y fa l l  subs tant ia l ly . 
Unfortuna �ely , the pub l ic is  not given s ta t i s t ics  for MAP 
expend itures . A f te r  the United S ta tes  S ena te  ma de a n  inve s t iga t ion , 
the MAP f igures for Tha iland d i s a ppea red from the AID Rep o rt . The 
MAP figures fo r Tha iland a re t ra ns ferred into the A rea P ro gram . The 
"A nnua l Report to Congre s s , F is cal Yea r 1 9 6 7 1 1  s ta tes : 
Tha il and cont inues to  support United S ta te s  ope ra t ions 
in Vie tnam and improved its  ca pa cb il it ies to put down 
inc ip ient ins urgency fomented by the Commun i s t s . In 
a s s o c ia t ion w ith the free wor l d  e ffort in S outhea s t  
A s ia , Laos  cont inued its comba t opera t ions in de fens e 
a ga ins t Pa the t Laos  and North Vi etnames e a ggres s ion . 
The s e  a c t ivities  we re suppo rted by MAP in F is ca l  Yea r  
1 96 7  but , due t o  the ir a c t ive comba t na ture , the a dmini ­
s tra t ion propo s ed to  the Congres s tha t pro gra ms for Laos  
a nd Tha iland , l ike tha t fo r Vietnam in  F is ca l  1 96 6 , be  
t rans ferred out  o f  MAP a nd funded from the Depa rtment 
of De fense budge t in Fis ca l Yea r 1 968 . 54 
5 3New York T imes , Augus t 1 3 ,  1 96 9 . 
54
The Fore ign A s s is tance P ro gram ,  Annua l Report to  the Congres s , 
F is ca l  Yea r 1 96 7  (Washington , D .  C . , Un ited S t a tes Gove rnment P r int ing 
O ffice , p .  42 . 
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S ta ted ve ry c l ea rly in the Un ited S ta tes S ta tutes at la rge 
was the fol l owing informa t ion concerning Department of De fens e 
expend itures : 
Vietname s e  forces , etc . , support . 
S e c . 8 38 ( a )  Not to exceed $ 2 , 500 , 000 , 000  o f  the 
a pp ro p r ia t ions ava il a b l e  to the Depa rtment o f  
De fens e during the current fis ca l yea r shal l be 
ava i l a b l e  for the ir s tated purp o s e s  to support : 
( 1 ) Vietname s e  and o the r free world forces in 
supp o rt o f  Vie tname s e  fo rces ; ( 2) l o cal fo rce s 
in Laos  and Tha iland ; and fo r re la ted co s t s , on 
such terms a nd cond it ions as the S e creta ry o f  
De fens e may de te rmine . . .  5 5  
There fo re , the amount o f  fore ign a id Tha iland obtained through 
MA P  is no t a va il a b l e  for the yea rs 1 968  through 1 97 2 . Furthermore , 
the re is a va s t  d ifference between the f igures l is ted in the Bres i -
dent ' s  budget mes s a ge and the a c tua l amount o f  do l l a rs s pent o n  MAP . 
Before a congres s iona l sub commit tee , Deputy .A s s i s t a nt S ecre t a ry o f  
De fens e f o r  Int erna t iona l S e curity .A ffa irs a cknowledged that the 
budget figure , wh ich is l imi ted to mil ita ry grants  and cred its , did 
not repres ent the ful l p icture . He ins is ted , howeve r ,  tha t the o the r 
components o f  the mil ita ry aid pro gram were o penly pres ented to Congres s  
in othe r pa rts o f  the budge t , o r  in legis la t ion s e pa rate from the fo re ign 
mil ita ry a id b i l l . The Chairman o f  the Jo int Congre s s iona l Economi c 
S ubcommittee noted tha t the Pres ident ' s budge t mes s age l is ted  $ 6 25 
mill ion unde r "mil ita ry a s s is tance , "  wh ile a s tudy by the Genera l 
.A c count ing O ffice for the sub commi t tee showed the t o t a l  came clos e to  
55united S ta tes S ta tutes  At  La rge , 9l s t  Congre s s , 2D S es s ion , 
1 97 0 - 1 9 7 1 , Vo l . 84 , Pa rt 2 (Wa shington , D .  C . : United S ta t e s  Gove rn ­
ment P r int ing O f fice) , p .  2036 . 
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$5 b i l l ion when a l l  forms of d i re c t  and ind ire ct  mil it a ry a s s is tance 
were included . The Deputy A s s i s t ant S e c retary of De fens e a dmit ted 
tha t his f i gures were $4 . 8 9 6  b il l ion , but , b e cause of "wa rtime con -
d i t ions , 1 1  the f i gures were no t ava ilable  in Wa shington . He explained 
tha t becaus e of the sub committee ' s  intere s t  a n  a ide wa s s ent to S outh -
5 6  
ea s t  A s ia to  obta in the f igures . 
The que s t ion a rises  whe ther the amount o f  dol l a rs from MAP 
for  Tha il and w i l l  go down in the future o r  not . I feel tha t s ome 
evidences ind ica te an  upwa rd trend in the future , a t  l ea s t  during 
P res ident N ixon ' s t e rm .  In 1 97 0 , Vice P res ident A gnew a s sured tha t 
he would do a l l  he coul d to prevent any reduct ion o f  the $ 30 mil l ion 
in e conomic a s s is t ance a nd $ 60  mil l ion in mil ita ry aid tha t comes 
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into Tha iland ea ch yea r . Furthermo re , the Tha i l ea ders a re a s sured 
by  the S ec reta ry of De fens e , Me lvin R .  La ird , tha t United S ta tes  mil i -
ta ry a id t o  Tha iland wil l increa s e  over the next ten years . The p ro -
p o s ed increa s e , he s a id ,  would re inforce the N ixon Do ctrine , under wh ich 
the United S ta tes  is to  help its a l l ies  to de fend thems e lves . 5 8  Neve r -
thel es s ,  i t  i s  ques t iona ble  tha t i t  wil l cont inue fo reve r .  
The Amer ican F ro e i gn A s s is tance P ro gram is important to the 
Tha i economy a nd devel opment . I t g ives Tha iland a t remendous a mount 
o f  fore ign exchange . In order to  show the imp o rtance o f  United S ta tes  
5 6New Yo rk T imes , Janua ry 7 ,  1 9 7 1 . 
5 7  
Ib id . , A ugus t 30 , 1 97 0 . 
5 8Ib id. , Ja nua ry 8 ,  1 97 1 . 
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fo re i gn a id in  Tha iland , Table  7 compa res it to non -American fore i gn 
a id .  T a b l e  7 shows tha t economic a id from America a l one in 1 96 6  
amount ed to  mo re than the tota l from non -United S ta te s  s o urces . The 
amount o f  Amer ica n - influenced a id may be undere s t ima ted in the d is -
cus s ion above b e caus e s ome United N a t ions ins t i tut ions , such as the 
Inte rna t iona l Bank for Re cons t ruct ion and Deve lopment , s ubs tant ia l l y  
incre a s e d  fo re i gn a id a fter the ups urge o f  interes t by the United 
S ta te s  in S ou thea s t  A s ia . Vot ing in such organiza t ions is  determined 
by ca p i ta l  s ub s crip t ion . S ince the United S ta tes is  the grea tes t con -
t r ibutor ,  a l loca t ion o f  funds i s  grea tly influenced by the United S ta tes . 
In fa ct , underdevel oped countries  o ften compla in about the domina nce 
of the la rger na t ions in the IBRD a nd s imil a r  ins t itut ions . 5 9  
A l though American fo re i gn a id is subs ta ntia l , the mo s t  imp ortant 
catego ry of United S ta tes exp end itures in Tha iland is dire ct a nd indirect  
mil ita ry s pend ing . As  , shown in  T a b l e  2 , in  1963  the American  mil ita ry 
expend iture s we re only $ 30 mil l ion; wherea s fore ign a id wa s $ 1 6 . 8  
mill ion ; in 1 964  Ame rican mil ita ry expend itures were a ga in $ 30 mil l ion , 
Amer ican fo�e ign a id wa s $ 2 3 . 1  mill ion . In 1 965  the mil ita ry exp end i -r 
tures inc rea s ed to  $ 50  mil l ion b e cause  o f  the La o t ian cris is ; foreign 
a id wa s $ 22 . 1  mil l ion . In 1 96 6 , the yea r tha t the America ns be came 
clo s e ly invo lved in the Vie tnam Wa r ,  the mil ita ry expenditure s in 
Tha iland were incre a s ed to $ 1 30 mil l ion wh ile  American a id wa s a lmo s t  
5 9Benj amin Higgins , Economic Deve lopment ; P robl ems , P r in c ipl e s , 
a nd Pol icies  (Revised  Ed it ion ; N ew Yo rk: W.  W .  No rton , 1 968) , pp . 5 91 -3 . 
I .  
w -....! 
II . 
TA BLE 7 
TOTAL FOREIGN ECONOMIC AID TO THAILAND 1 9 6 2 /1967  
UNT IED STATES FIS CAL YEA R 
(Mil l ions o f  Do l l a rs ) 
1962  1 9 6 3  1964 1965  1966  
Non -United S ta tes  
A .  Grants & T e ch . A s s is tance 
U .N .  3 . 0 1 . 9  3 . 2  3 . Be 3 . 9e 
Third Countries 4 . 1 4 . 4 4 . 0 4 . 3  5 . 9  
Subtota l 7 . 1 6 . 3 7 . 2 8 . 1 9 . 8 
B .  O fficia l  Loans 
IBRD - - - 40 . 6  - - - 28 . 0  36 . 0  
Germany - - - 22 . 3  9 . 9  3 . 3  7 . 4  
Aus tria - - - - - - - - - - - - 3 . 3  
Ca na da - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --- -- --
Subto tal  - - - 6 2 . 9  9 . 9  31 . 3  46 . 7  
TOTAL Non -United S tates 7 . 1 6 9 . 2  17 . 1  3 9 . 4  5 6 . 5  
United S ta tes 
A .  Grants & Tech . A s s is tance 25 . 9  17 . 3  12 . 7  19 . 9  43 . 3  
B .  Loans ( including Ex -Im Bank) 22 . 0  4 . 9  2 . 1 - - - 15 . 0  
c .  Pea ce Co rps __..:!±. _._9 2 . 0 2 . 2 2 . 8 
TOTAL United S ta tes  48 . 3  23 . 1  16 . 8  2 2 . 1  61 . 1  
GRAND TOTAL 5 5 . 4  92 . 3  33 . 9  61 . 5  117 . 6  
* 
* 
19 6 2 -67 '� 1967  
4 . 8e 20 . 6  
6 . 8 2 9 . 5  
11 . 6  50 . 1  
11 . 0  115 . 6  
. 6  43 . 4  
- - - 3 . 3  
_l:.Q ___L.Q 
12 . 6  16 3 . 3  
24 . 2  213 . 4 
49 . 8  168 . 9  
6 . 9 50 . 9  
--1..:..Q. 11 . 3  
5 9 . 7  2 31 . 1  
8 3 . 9  444 . 5  
Jus t a fter  the turn o f  the ca l enda r year 1967 , Japan a greed to provide $ 60 mil l ion 
in commercia l credits  to Tha iland . 
e = e s t ima ted . 
S ource : Na t iona l Economi c Devel onment Boa rd of Th a i l � n rl _ A n r i l ? <; _ 1 % R  _ 
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t r ipled  to $ 6 1 . l  mil l ion . In tha t yea r the tota l non -United S ta tes  
a id wa s $ 5 6 . 5  mil l ion - -$4 . 6  mil l ion les s tha n the A merican a id .  
Beginning in 1 96 6  the mil ita ry expend itures exceeded the comb ined 
amount o f  American a id and non -United S ta tes a id .  In 1 96 7  the 
American mil i ta ry expend itures a l one were much more tha n the com­
b ined amount of a l l  o the r flow o f  fore ign res ource s . Unque s tionably , 
the s ignificance o f  the American mil ita ry expend itures ha s been 
tremendous in comp a r i s on to fore ign a id .  
CHAPTER IV 
SELECTED EFFECTS OF AMERICAN EXPENDITURES ON THE THAI ECONOMY 
There a re many effects  o f  American expenditures on the Tha i 
e conomy , but in this  cha pter s ome e f fects  which a re pert inent to  
e conomic development will  be dis cus s ed . 
F irs tly , the mos t  important e f fe c t  is  the increa s e  in demand 
crea ted by the American mil ita ry bu ild -up . The American  purcha s e s  
o f  goods a n d  s ervices from the Tha i e conomy increa s e s  the income o f  
the s e l l ers , who , i n  turn , consume p a r t  o f  wha t they rec e ive w ith 
many s ub s e quent expenditure rounds a s  the mul t ipl ier  works i ts e l f  
out . Reduced d emand , whi ch w il l  o ccur a fter the w i thdrawa l ,  will  
hit  very hard in  s ome s e c t o rs - -e s p e c ia l ly the s e rvice s e c to r . A 
goo d exampl e  o f  inves tment to  p rovide s ervices  is the cons t ruct ion 
o f  many new hot e l s  to accorm:noda te  the America n  s o l d iers  on R a nd R .  
( S ee Figure 4) . 
S ome hote l s  had s igned contra cts  with the United S ta tes  
mil ita ry a utho r ity a nd were  us ed as  lodgings for personnel . When 
w ithdrawa l a ccel e ra ted and R and R expenditures fel l  in Tha il a nd ,  
ma ny o f  thes e  ho t e l s  l o s t  the ir cont ra cts  with the mil ita ry . Now 
o pen for a ny touris t ,  the hot e l s  a re f inding it d i fficul t to ma in­
t a in a l ow va cancy l evel , even in the tour i s t  sea s on . 
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1960 1 961  1 962 1 963 1 964 1 965 1 966 1 967 1 968 
• 
S ou r ce :  T our i st O rga n iz a t ion o f  Tha il and , S ta t i s t i cs on 
Tou r i s m  i n  Tha i l a nd , Bangkok , 1 9 6 9 , p .  2 9 . 
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Furthermo re , the impa c t  o f  United S ta tes  expend itures is 
s trong in a rea s surround ing the ba s e towns whe re the Amer ican s o l d iers  
s pend mos t  o f  the ir t ime . I t is  e s t ima ted tha t about  40  percent o f  
a n  American s o l d ier ' s income in Tha ila nd i s  s pent o n  food , rent , a nd 
o ther hous eho l d  expend iture s , whi l e  another 30 percent goe s  to ente r­
ta inment o f  va r ious kinds . 6 0  In the Northea s t  region where the re a re 
f ive b a s e s  l o c a t e d , the United S ta tes  expenditure s  brings economic 
growth to tha t region a s  shown in T a b l e  8 .  
In the Northea s t  the p er ca p ita GDP in 1 96 3  wa s 1 , 347 baht a t  
1 96 6  prices  whi l e  in 1 96 6  per ca p it a  GDP increa s e d  t o  1 , 440 baht ; 6 1  
and popula tion in the s e  area s increa s ed from 1 37 , 6 32  t o  1 64 , 8 1 7 . Both 
increa sed  GDP per ca pita  and increa s ed popula t ion sugge s t  the inc rea s e  
in e conomic a c t ivity . Another ind ica tor o f  economic growth in the s e  
a rea s i s  the numerica l increa s e  in mo tor  vehicl e s  and bus ine s s es . 
The United S ta t e s  Emb a s s y  e s t ima ted tha t the baht e quiva l ent 
of a b out $ 2 , 00 0  p e r  American s o l d i e r  is s pent annua l ly on the l o ca l  
e conomy t o  ma inta in the s e rvicemen a nd the ba s e . About ha l f  o f  this  
is  s p ent by the ba s e  for local  ma teria l s , payro l l s  a nd mis c e l l a neous 
b a s e  s p end ing . The o ther ha l f  is  s p ent by the s e rviceman hims e l f .
6 2  
6 0  
Bank o f  Tha iland , U . S . Mil ita ry Expend itures in Tha iland , 
unpubl ished do cument , Ba ngkok , J a nua ry 1 97 1 , p .  3 .  
6 1
The consume r price  index o f  Tha iland wa s 100  in 1 96 3  a nd 
10 7  in 1 96 6 . 
6 2  
United Sta tes  Emba s s y , E conomic Impa ct  of  U . S . Mi l ita ry 
Expenditures in the No rthea s t , unpubl ished report , Bangkok , F eb rua ry 
1 96 9 , p .  1 .  
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TABLE 8 
INDICATORS OF ECONOMIC GROWTH IN THE NORTHEA ST 1 960 -67  
1 960  1 96 3  1 9 6 4  1 96 5  1 96 6  1 96 7  
Per  Ca p ita GDPa 
( Baht , current 
nab pr ices) 1 , 25 9  1 , 240 1 , 25 1  1 , 440 
Popul a t ion o f  Ma jo r  
C ities  1 1 9  , 8 7 2  1 37 , 6 32  146 , 649 1 5 9 , 6 20 1 64 , 817 1 8 2 , 7 48 
Revenue o f  Ma j or 
C i t ie s  (Mil l ion 
Baht) 7 . 14  9 . 4 9  1 3 . 08 1 3 . 7 0  1 6 . 36 2 2 . 64 
Vehicle  Regis tra -
t ion o f  Ma j or 
nab C it ies 4 , 8 85 1 0 , 87 2  14 , 30 1  1 6 , 05 3c 2 3 , 8 9 7  
Bus ine s s es Regis -
tered in C i t i e s  231  423  5 1 9  6 24 7 7 6  nab 
aGro s s  Dome s t i c  P roduc t .  
bNo t ava ilable . 
cin 1 96 5  Vehicl e Reg is t ra t ion figures c overed from Janua ry to 
S eptembe r  only . 
S ource: U . S . Emba s s y , Economic Impa ct o f  United S ta tes  Mil ita ry 
Expend itures in the No rthea s t ,  unpubl ished report , Bangkok , Februa ry 
1 96 9 , Tabl e 3 .  
S econdly , in the monet a ry s ector , b a l ance o f  payments surpluses  
increa s e  the s upply o f  money in  the  dome s t i c  e conomy becaus e the sur -
p lus do l l a rs were purcha s ed w ith baht by the government . This , in turn 
means tha t the genera l l evel of e conomic a c tivities  is further s timu -
l a ted by the expans ion in credit a nd fina nc ia l  ma rke t s . The urban  
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regions a re a ffected mos t ly in moneta ry p olicy since the res t o f  the 
e conomy is not p a r t  of the modern s e ctor . 
Thirdly , the American expenditures caus e a n  increa s e  in the 
government ' s revenue a s  shown in Table  9. One o f  the main s ources 
of the government ' s  revenue is from taxa tion . American expenditures 
help to genera t e  more income for the Tha is  and this a dded income is  
a l s o  taxed by the government . 
TABLE 9 
IMPACTS OF U . s . MILITARY EXPENDITURES ON TAX REVENUE 
Yea r 
1966 
Mil lion $ 
% Increa s e  
1967 
Mil lion $ 
% Increa s e  
1968 
Mil lion $ 
% Increa s e  
1969 
Million $ 
% Increa s e  
1970 
Mil lion $ 
% Increa s e  
Tax 
Revenue 





16 . 30 
( 14 ,834 .60) 
741 . 7  
l l  .52 
(16,531.60) 
826.5 




L e s s Tax Revenue 
Because o f  U . S .  
Milita ry Expend . 
(888 .18) 
44.4 
( H 292 .38) 
64.6 
45.51 
(1, 335. 28) 
66 . 7  
3 . 32 
(1,257 . 36) 
62 . 8  
-5 . 84 





no , .?49 . s2) 
527.4 
( 12 ,009 . 62) 
600.4 
13.84 
(13,l,c99 . 32) 
67 4.9 
12. 40 
( 15,27 4.24) 
7 63. 7  
13 . 15 
(17 ,503. 66) 
8 7 5.1 
14.60 
No t e: The numbers in pa renthes e s  a re the o rigina l amounts  in 
millions o f  baht . The amount o f  U . S . dol l a rs unde r  is only a rough 
e s tima te . 
S ource: Na tiona l Economic Deve l opment Boa rd . 
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In Tabl e  9 ,  tax revenue s from American mil ita ry expend itures 
incre a s ed from $44 . 4  mil l ion in 1 96 6  to  $ 64 . 6  mil l ion in 1 96 7 , a 45 . 5 1 
percent increa s e .  This  sha rp increa s e  is  due to  the ra p id r i s e  in 
u . s . expend itures s ince 1 96 5 . Tax revenue in 1 96 9  wa s reduced by 5 . 84 
percent o f  the l evel in 1 968 . In 1 97 0  i t  wa s reduced further by 1 8 . 4 9 
percent o f  the l evel in 1 9 6 9 , o r  a bout $ 1 1 . 6  mil l ion . Neve rthel e s s , 
total  tax revenue resul t ing from U . S . mi l it a ry expenditures is much 
l a rger than s ta ted in the tabl e  b ecaus e income and tax revenue gene r ­
a ted b y  the mul t ipl ier a re not included . 
Fourthly , the presence o f  American fo rces  ha s a l s o  provided 
employment opportunities  for ma ny Tha is .  The emp loyment induced by 
the American expenditures coul d be d ivided into two ca t e go ries : 
d irectly - induced emp loyment and indirectly- induced emp loyment . The 
d irectl y - induced emp l oyment is a j ob tha t resul t s  from d i rect  hiring 
on United S ta te s  mil ita ry p roj e c t s , such as  the cons t ruct ion and 
ma intenance of  b a s e s . The ind irectly- induced emp l oyment is  a j ob 
crea ted by the American s o l d ier ' s expenditures , such a s  the girls  
work in  ma s s a ge parlors . 
Table  10  shows the numbe r  o f  directly - induced j obs . Fo r the 
number  of directly - induced j ob s , a bout f ive t imes the numbe r  of tho s e  
who work i n  Bangkok a re working i n  the p rovince s . Roughly , ha l f  o f  
them a re s emi -skil l ed and uns kil l ed workmen . Th is group o f  workers  
is  go ing to  b e  a ffected if  the w i thdrawa l o c curs . They may be 
unemp l oyed o r  have to go . to the fa rms . The o ther g roup , pro fes s iona l s , 
subprofe s s iona l s  a nd skil l ed workmen may f ind o ther j ob s  wh ich a re not 
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TABLE 1 0  
DIRECTLY-INDUCED EMPLOYMENT B Y  U . S . MILITA RY EXPENDITURES 
S EPTEMBER 1 96  9 
(number o f  employees) 
Types of Worke r s  
Profe s s iona l s  a nd S ub -pro fe s s iona l s . , . . 
Skil led  Workmen . • . .  
S emi - skilled  Wo rkmen 
Unski l l e d  Wo rkmen . .  
Others (uncl a s s ified) . 
Tota l 
P l a ces o f  Wo rk 
S a t tahip 
Takhl i 
Kora t . 
Ubon . 
Udorn . 
Nakorn Phanom . 
Tota l 
Bangkok . 
O thers . 
To ta l 
Amount 
8 '  982  
6 , 47 6 
6 , 354 
6 '7 9 1  
5 , 8 3 3  
34 , 436 
Amount 
7 , 0 8 6  
2 ,  7 1 5 
6 , 0l l  
2 , 48 7  
4 , 342 
3 , 410 
. 2 6 , 05 1  
5 , 9 94 
2 , 3 91 
34 , 436  
S ource: Na t iona l E conomic Deve l opment Board , Unpub l ished 
Report o f  the Na t iona l Economic Devel opment Boa rd to the Cab inet 
in Tha i ,  Bangkok , 1 96 9 ,  p .  3 .  
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the ca reers they s p e c ia l ized in . Hence , they w i l l  be  unde remp loyed 
until  the pe riod o f  a djus tment is ove r . A l though i t  is  es t ima ted 
tha t only . 23 p e rcent of  the labor fo rce were d irec t ly dependent on 
U . S . mil i t a ry exp enditures for employment in 1 96 9 , 6 3  the percenta ge 
would  b e  much h i gher i f  the emp loyment genera ted by fore ign inve s t -
ment inflow resul t ing from U . S . expend iture s ,  res t  a nd recrea t ion 
expenditure � fore ign a id and the emp l oyment crea ted by the mul t ipl ier 
e ffect of a ll thes e  d ire ct expenditures were included . Table 1 2 , 
which wa s ca l cul a ted  from T a b l e  1 1 , revea l s  tha t U . S . expend itures 
excluding foreign a id va ried between 3 and 5 percent of GNP between 
1 96 6  and 1 97 1 . A s s uming a s impl e  mul t ip l ier o f  2 . 4 ,  s omewhere 
b e tween 5 and 12 p ercent of GNP , d epending on the import content o f  
the expenditures ,  resul t s  from U . S .  p re s ence i n  S ou thea s t  A s ia .  
P e rhap s  1 to  1 0  p e rcent  o f  the workforce a re dependent on U . S . expend i -
tures , therefore , s ince such a l a rge prop ort ion o f  the wo rkforce is  
rura l . 64 A more relevant percent a ge would b e  tha t o f  the urban work -
force s ince it  is  the po l it ic iz ed port ion o f  the popul a t ion . The 
pe rcenta ge o f  the urban workforce dependent on U . S . exp enditures would  
b e  much h igher, ,  by  a tru}:y s igni f icant amount . 
6 3rhe e s t ima ted tota l l a b o r  fo rce in 1 9 6 9  wa s 15 . 5  mil l ion . 
64
1 . . d h 7 5 f h kf d t i s  e s t ima te  t a t  percent o t e wo r orce wa s enga ge 
in a gricul ture in 1 97 1 . 
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TABLE 1 1  
GNP , FOREIGN INVESTMENT INFLOWS AND U . S .  MILITARY EXPENDITURES 
(mi ll ion o f  bah t s) 
Yea r 
1 955  
1 95 6  
1 95 7  
1 95 8  
1 95 9  
1 960 
1 96 1  
1 96 2  
1 96 3  
1 964 
1 965  
1 96 6  
1 9 67 
1 968  
1 96 9  
1 97 0  
1 97 1  
Boa rd . 
GNP FIIa R & R Gb RRGc 
3 9 , 31 0 . 6  50 . 0  1 5 7 . 9  1 5 7 . 9  
40 , 8 7 5 . 3  50 . 0  154 . 4  154 . 4  
45 , 1 95 . 3 5 0 . 0  2 1 3 . 9  2 1 3 . 9  
47 , 0 2 1 . 1  7 0 . 0  250 . 6  250 . 6  
50 , 30 9 . 4  7 2 . 0  2 7 8 . 8  2 7 8 . 8  
5 3 , 8 84 . 9  7 1 . 7 36 3 . 1  3 6 3 . l  
5 8 , 87 6 . 7  1 38 . 6 448 . 0  448 . 0  
6 3 , 6 94 . 6  200 . 0  640 . 6  640 . 6  
6 8 , 0 38 . 2  37 0 . 7  7 32 . 0  7 32 . o  
7 4 , 5 8 8 . 6  421 . 5  9 2 5 . 3  925 . 3  
84 , 2 9 1 . 9  9 1 0  . 3  5 0 . 0  1491 . 5  1 541 . 5  
1 0 1 , 3 6 6 . 5  6 2 9 . 0  1 36 . 0  3557 . 2  36 9 3 . 2  
108 , 46 2 . 0  9 6 9 . 3  2 1 6 . 0  48 80 . l  5 0 96 . 1  
1 1 7 , 046 . 0 1 320 . 0  405 . 0  5 5 7 1 . 9 5 97 6 . 9  
1 28 ' 7 92 . o  1 1 6 5 . 7 45 9 . 0 5 28 7 . 9  5 746 . 9  
1 3 6 , 3 2 8 . 0  9 9 6  . 8  395 . 0  48 3 9 . 8  5 2 34 . 8  
144 , 5 1 0 . 0  1 0 1 7 . 8  2 3 9 . 0  45 14 . 2  47 5 3 . 2 
aFore i gn inves tment infl ows . 
b 
u . s . Government exp end iture s . 
cRes t and Recupe ra t ion a nd U . S . Government exp end itures . 
Source : Ba nk o f  Thailand a nd Na t iona l Economi c  Development 
Yea r 
1 955  
1 95 6  
1 957 
1 958  
1 9 5 9  
1 960 
1 96 1  
1 96 2  
1 9 6 3 
1 964 
1 96 5  
1 96 6  
1 96 7 
1 96 8  
1 96 9 
1 97 0  
1 97 1  
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TABLE 1 2  
FOREIGN INVESTMENT INFLOWS AND U . s . MILITARY EXPENDITURES 
( p ercenta ge  o f  GNP) 
FII RRG 
. 1 27 . 401  
. 1 2 2  . 37 7  
. l lO  . 47 3  
. 148 . 5 32  
. 143 . 5 54 
. 1 33 . 6 7 3 
. 2 35  . 7 60 
• 31 3 1 . 005  
. 544 1 . 0 7 5  
. 5 6 5  1 . 240 
1 . 0 7 9  1 . 8 28  
. 6 20 3 . 643 
. 8 93 4 . 6 98 
1 . 1 27  5 . 10 6  
. 90 5  4 . 46 2  
. 7 31 3 . 8 3 9  
. 7 04 3 . 28 9  
S ource : Bank o f  Tha iland a nd Na t iona l E conomi c Development 
Boa rd . 
CHAPTER V 
THE ECONOMIC IMPACTS 
The Hypo thes is 
The Tha i government , its  e c onomic a genc ies and many high­
ranking o f f i cers , c ontend tha t the impa cts  o f  Amer ican w i thdrawa l 
f rom S outhea s t  A s ia w i l l  be  very sma l l  and w il l  not re t a rd economi c 
growth a nd o therw is e  be ha rmful to  the economic s itua t ion o f  the 
count ry a s  a who l e . Three such s ta tements fol l ow :  
Tha i land ' s  representa t ive to the twenty - f if th annua l s e s s ion 
o f  the Economic Commi s s ion fo r A s ia and the Fa r Ea s t  (ECAFE) in April  
1 96 9 , ma inta ined tha t it wa s pa t ent nons ense to  s up p o s e  tha t fore i gn 
military expend itures ,  a s  a s ingl e influence , a ccounted for any s ig­
nificant pa rt o f  the recent e conomi c growth o r  tha t withdrawa l would 
induce a s e tba ck in the performance of Tha i e conomy . Ra the r ,  he 
cla imed Tha i l and ' s  ra p id economic p ro gres s ha d been due more to the 
government ' s  l ong -term p l a nning a nd cons c ient ious u s e  of the country ' s 
re source s  than to any t rans ito ry s t imul i  such a s  the income generated 
by American pres ence in Tha iland . He concluded tha t  the w ithdrawa l o f  
American  forces from Tha iland , a count ry tha t i s  among the sma l l e s t  
bene f i c ia r_ie s  o f  _the Vietnam Wa r ,  no twiths tand ing whe the r  the 
4 9  
5 0  
withdrawa l is  rap id o r  gra dua l , w i l l  cause n o  dis loca t ion in the Tha i 
6 5  
e conomy . 
Another s ta t ement o f  thi s  pos i t ion o c curred when the Finance 
Minister ,  Serm Vinicchayakul , gave his  pers ona l view concerning the 
a nnouncement by P res ident N ixon o f  withdrawa l o f  2 5 , 00 0  American 
troops f rom South Vietnam in July 1 96 9 ;  the Tha i minis ter s ta ted 
tha t the move would not a ffect  Tha iland ' s  e conomic s itua t ion s ince 
the los t income from the American t roops  coul d be  compens a ted for 
by the tour i s t  indu s t ry . He noted , however ,  tha t skilled  laborers , 
e s pe cia l l y  in the cons t ruct ion indus t ry , would feel  the impa ct o f  
w ithdrawa l , s ince their  j ob s  a re dependent upon cons t ruct ion expendi­
tures by American mil ita ry uni t s  s ta t ioned in Tha iland . 6 6  
Even the N a t iona l Development Minis te r  Pote  S a ra s in s a id on 
August  2 8 , 1 96 9 ,  tha t withdrawa l o f  American troops from Tha iland 
l d  t • 1 ff  h t I • d • t • 6 7 wou no s e r io us y a e c t  t e coun ry s e conomic con i ion . Minister  
Pote  is cha irma n  o f  a corrnnittee  c a r rying out  an e conomic s tudy concern -
ing expenditures b y  American mil i t a ry fo rces in Tha iland '. H i s  s ta t e -
ment , c ited  above , wa s th e out come o f  the corrnnittee ' s  s tudy tha t wa s 
s ubmitted to the P r ime Minister  on Augus t 2 1 , 1 9 6 9 . More s pec i f ica l l y , 
he reported tha t  United S ta t es  mil it a ry cons truct ion in Tha iland ha d 
b een s topped fo r over a yea r and there were only 20 , 00 0  Tha i na t iona l s  
6 5  
Fo re ign A ffa irs Bul l e t in , Vol . VIII , No .  5 ,  A pril -May 1 96 9 , 
Minis try o f  Foreign A ffa irs , Bangkok , Tha iland , pp . 40 6 -7 . 
6 6Ib ; d , , Vol . 6 1 1 96 9  493  � VIII , No .  , June -Ju y , p .  . 
6 7Ibid . ,  Vo l . IX , No .  1 ,  Augus t -S eptembe r  1 96 9 ,  p .  7 5. 
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wo rking with the American troops . Since the United Sta tes  w ithdrawa l 
woul d not take p la ce a b rup tly , the s e  Tha i wo rkers would  have enough 
t ime to f ind o ther j ob s . Bes ides , the American expenditure s in Tha i ­
l a nd la rgely go for s e rvice s ; cons e quently , the economi c impa ct to  
follow the ir depa rture would  not b e  s o .  s erious . 6 8  
I ma inta in the oppos ite po int o f  view . United Sta tes with ­
drawa l w i l l  cau s e  a sub s tantia l reduc t ion in economic growth . Indeed , 
the government overlooked s ome fa ctors , such a s  p r iva te fore ign inves t­
ment inflow , whi ch a re dependent upon American p re s ence in Tha il and . 
The s e  influences which a re overlooked p l a y  a n  important rol e  in 
e conomic growth . 
The fore i gn inves tment inflow is  caused  by two phenomena . 
Firs t ly ,  the American expenditures undoub tedly crea ted a huge a dd i ­
t iona l demand f o r  the cus toma ry goods and s ervices  o f  Tha iland . 
However , Ame r i can  expenditure s a l s o  crea t ed demand for goods a nd 
s e rvices tha t were never p roduced o r  imported a t  a l l . Both types  o f  
demand s t imula te d  the foreign inves tment inflow . Some o f  i t  may b e  
cons idered t o  b e  directed towa rd imp o rt sub s t itut ion . Secondly , a s  
American expend itures increa sed , _ _  fore ign exchange reserves a l s o  
inc rea sed  and p l ent i ful fore ign exchange res e rves fos t e r  a more re cep ­
t ive a t t itude t owa rd convers ion a nd repa t ria t ion o f  ea rnings by fore i gn 
inves tors . The a b s ence o f  res trict ions o f  profit  remit tance increa sed  
6 8Ib id . 
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inve s tment , 6 9  a l though this i s  a l e s s e r  influence o n  the fore ign 
inves tment than the firs t one . 
This  s tudy inves t iga tes  the rel a t ionship betwe en American 
expend itures a nd the fo re ign inves tment inflow . I hypo the s ized a 
po s it ive corre l a t ion between the United S ta tes expend itures a nd the 
fore ign inves tment inf l ows . S p e c i f i ca l ly :  
where 
FII = f ( RRG) , 
FII is fore i gn inve s tment inf low ( dependent 
va ria b le) ; a nd 
RRG is res t  and  re cupe ra t ion and United S ta te s  
government expend itures ( independent va riable)  • 
A s econd hypothes is tes te d  concerns the rel a t ionship between 
Ame rican mil ita ry expend itures a nd the gro s s na t iona l  produc t . I t  is 
expected tha t the higher the United S ta tes  expenditures ,  the higher 
the gro s s  na t iona l  product . In o the r words , I exp e c t  a po s it ive 
correla t ion between gro s s  na t iona l p roduc t and Amer ican expend itures :  
where 
GNP = f ( RRG) , 
GNP is gro s s  na t iona l product (de pendent 
va riable) ; a nd 
RRG is  res t  a nd recup era t ion and  United S ta tes  
government expend itures ( inde pendent va riable) • 
F ina lly , an  indirect  me thod o f  tes t ing the hypo thes e s  is  to  
inve s t iga t e  the r el a t ionship be tween fore ign inves tment inflow and the 
6 9uni ted S ta tes Emba s s y ,  E conomi c Impa ct  of  a Pha s edown o f  
United S ta te s  Mil ita ry S pend ing in Tha iland , unpub l i shed do cument , 
Bangkok , Ma y 1 9 6 9 , p . 3 .  
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gros s nat iona l  p roduct . A ga in ,  I exp e c t  a pos it ive corre la t ion 
be tween the dependent and inde pendent va riabl e s . S pe c if ica l ly: 
where 
GNP = f (FII) , 
GNP is gro s s  na t iona l  produc t (dependent 
va r ia b l e) ; a nd 
FII is fore ign inves tment inflow ( inde pendent 
va ria b l e) . 
Me thod o f  T es t ing and Dat a 
Regre s s ion o f  t ime s eries  ha s been cho s en for tes t ing thes e 
hyp othes es , and the pe riod s e l e cted for the analys is is from 1955 to 
1971 . The o rd ina ry l ea s t  s quare me thod  is emp l oyed in o rder to es t i -
mate the regres s ion e qua t ion . 
Fore ign inves tment inflow da ta a s  we l l  a s  R and R and United 
S ta tes  government expend itures were taken from Tha il and ' s b a l a nce o f  
I 
payment s during tha t per iod . The item "Government Not Included El s e -
where" i s  a p p ropriate  for the ana lys is , s ince i t  includes a l l  American  
mil ita ry expend itures except R a nd R.  The fore ign a s s is �ance expend i -
tures are .no t included in the regre s s ion ana lys is because o f  l a ck o f  
MA P  expend itures in s ome yea rs . A s  d is cus s ed previous ly , MAP expendi -
tures a re con fidential  for s e curity rea s ons . A s e cond rea s on why 
foreign aid is not included in the equa t ion is tha t the f igures o f  AID 
a re not  app rop r ia te for the ana lys is becaus e they a re presented in  the 
fo rm of f is ca l  yea r s , whe rea s the o ther figures in this s tudy a re p re -
p res ented fo r ca l enda r years . The b reakdown o f  th is item is shown in 
Table  13 . 
TA BLE 1 3  
BREAKDOWN OF GOVERNMENT N . I . E .  a 
(mi l l ion o f  bahts)  
1 965 1 9 6 6  1 96 7  1 968  1 96 9  1 97 0  1 97 1  
Re ceipts 1 , 491 . 5  3 , 55 7 . 2  4 , 880 . l  5 , 5 7 1 . 9  5 , 28 7 . 9  4 , 8 3 9 . 8  4 , 51 4 . 2  
Mil ita ry 9 2 2 . 1  2 , 58 9 . l  4 , 10 9 . 2  4 , 91 7 . 8  4 , 6 2 9 . 7  4 , 1 92 . 1  3 , 7 8 8 . 5 
U . S . Mil ita ry P ers onnel 
and A gencies ( 8 6 4 . 4) ( 2 , 0 15 . 5 ) ( 3 , 2 91 . 0) (4 , 4 94 . 3) (4 , 388 . 7 ) (4 , 15 9 . 4) ( 3 , 754 . 9) 
U . S . Contra ctor fo r 
Mil ita ry Pr9j ect  ( - - ) ( 5 65 . 8) ( 8 1 3 . 5)  ( 383 . 4) ( 7 8 . 9) ( 4 . 6) ( 1 1 . 0) 
Non -Mil ita ry 5 6 9 . 4  968 . l  7 7 0 . 9  654 . 1  658 . 2  647 . T 7 25 . 7 
V1 +:'-
Payments 1 8 2 . 7  1 94 . 4 261 . 4  47 7 . 7  45 2 . 7  3 95 . 3  399 . 0  
Mil ita ry 3 . 3  6 . 9 15 . 1  1 9 . 8  2 1 . 9  1 4 . 9  24 . 8  
Non -Mil itary 1 7 9 . 4  1 8 7 . 5  246 . 3  45 7 . 9  430 . 8  380 . 4  374 . 2  
Service under AID P rograms ( 7 0  . 6) ( 8 7 . 7 ) ( 1 35 .  9) ( 330 . 7 ) ( 2 98 . 5) ( 1 9 3 . 0) ( 1 6 2 . 7 )  
N e t  Government N . I . E .  - _ j-1 , 308 . 8  +3 , 36 2 . 8  +4 , 6 18 . 7  ;-_5_, 0 94 . �--+4_.__8�5 ·�� ��444 . 5  +4 , 1 15 . 2  
a 
Not Included El s ewhere . 
S ource : Bank o f  Tha iland . 
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The gro s s  na t iona l p roduct da ta wa s obta ined from the Na t iona l 
Economic Devel o pment Boa rd o f  Tha iland . A l l  da ta is  g iven in T a b l e  1 1 . 
The resul t s  o f  the regre s s ions a re a s  fol l ows : 
Equa tion 1 
FII 100 . 37 + . l 9RRG where 
S tandard e rror 
t -s ta t i s t i c  
( 5 5 . 1 1) 
( 1 . 82) 
( . 0 2) 
( 10 . 55) ; and 
R2 . 8 8  
F -s ta t i s t i c  1 11 . 32 
F -tabl e , 1% 8 . 68 
The t -table  ( two -ta il) sugge s t s  
1 %  t 2 . 947 
5% t = 2 . 1 31 
10% t 1 . 7 5 3  
The Durb in -Wa t s on s ta t is t ic (d) = 1 . 7 3 ,  
whe re a t  the 1% l evel , 
cir. = . 8 7  4 - dL = 3 . 1 3 
du 1 . 1 0  4 du 
= 2 . 90 
S ince d is  in the a cceptable  range , 1 . 10 < d < 2 .  90 ' 
auto - co rrel a t ion . 
the re i s  no 
Equa t ion 2 
GNP 
S tandard e rro r 
t -s ta t is t ic 
5 .6 
4 9 2 21 . 4  + 14 . 5 2RRG 
( 40 1 7  . 6 2) ( 1 . 30) 
( 1 2 . 25)  ( 1 1 . 20) ; 
R2 . 8 9 
F -s ta t is tic  1 25 . 36 
F -table , 1% = 8 . 68 
The t -ta b l e  ( two -ta il)  sugge s t s  
1% t = 2 . 947 
The Durb in -Wa t s on s ta t i s t i c  ( d) 
where a t  the 1% l evel , 
. 5 3  ' 
. 8 7  
1 . 10  
4 - � = 3 . 1 3  
4 - du 2 . 9o 
where 
and 
S ince d is in the rejectable  range , 0 < d ( . 87 ,  there is auto ­
co rrela t ion . 
Equa t ion 3 
GNP 
S ta nda rd e rro r 
t -s ta t is t ic 
44324 + 7 1 . 6 3FII 
(48 36 . 18) (7 . 1 9) 
( 9 . 1 7)  ( 9 . 9 6) ; 
R2 
F - s ta t is t i c  
F -ta b l e , 1% 
whe re 
a nd 
= . 8 7 
= 9 9 . 2 5 
= 8 . 68 
The t - tab l e  ( two -ta il)  sugge s t s  
1 %  t = 2 . 947 . 
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The Durbin -Wa t s on s t a t i s t ic ( d) = 1 . 37 ,  
where at the 1% l evel , 
dL = . 8 7  
du = 1 . 1 0 
4 - dL 3 . 1 3  
4 - du = 2 . 90 
S ince d is in the a cceptab l e  range , 1 . 10  < d ( 2 . 90 ,  the re is  no 
auto- correla t ion . 
Conc lus ion 
A s  expe cted , there a re pos i t ive rela t ionsh ips between inde­
p endent and dependent va ria b l e s  in a l l  three regre s s ion e qua t ions . 
The coefficient o f  determina t ion , obta ined from the f irs t e qua t ion , 
is  quite high ( . 8 8) and , from the F -t es t , it  is  s ignif icant a t  the 
1 pe rcent l evel . The es t ima ted coe f fic ients o f  the regre s s ion a re 
s ignificant a t  10 percent for the cons tant and 1 pe rcent fo r RRG . 
The re is no auto - correla t ion in this e qua t ion . In o the r words , 
fo re ign inves tment inf l ow is determined by re s t  and re cupera t ion 
expend itures a nd United S ta tes government e�penditures . 
In the s e cond e quat ion , the coe fficient o f  determina t ion is  
high and s igni f i cant at  the 1 p e rcent l evel . The coe f f i c ient s a re 
a l s o  s ignif icant a t  the 1 p ercent l evel . Howeve r ,  there is auto ­
correla t ion wh ich o c curs in th is e qua t ion . I t  means tha t e ithe r a 
va riable  is mis s ing o r  error in the da ta is  cumul a t ive and no t random 
a s  a s s umed . But there rema ins s ome doubt s  concern ing the s igni ficance 
o f  the rel a t ionship . 
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I t  ha s been shown tha t RRG determines FII and there is  auto­
correla t ion which o ccurs in the re l a t ionship between RRG and GNP . 
However , by us ing ind irect a na lys is a s  in E qua t ion 3 above , a better  
resul t can  be obta ined . The th ird reg re s s ion e qua t ion shows tha t FII , 
whi ch is determined by RRG , det e rmines the level o f  GNP . The coe ffi ­
c ient o f  determina t ion is h i gh a nd s igni ficant a t  1 percent . A l l  
coeff ic ients a re a l s o  s ignif icant a t  1 p ercent , a nd the re i s  no auto­
correl a t ion . S impl e  Keyne s ian e conomics shows tha t inve s tment can 
gene ra te a change in GNP through the mechanism of the mul t iplier . 
Thus , the ind irec t  resul t g iven in the third e qua t ion is suppo rted by 
very ba s ic economic theo ry . There fore , Ame r ican expenditures in 
Tha iland have a sub s tantia l influence on GNP and e conomi c growth o f  
Tha iland . I f  the fore ign a id were a dded a s  a n  addit iona l va riable  in 
the ana lys is , it woul d p ropba bly imp rove the re sul t , s ince it is quite 
a l a rge amount of money . 
The Na t iona l E conomic Devel opment Boa rd o f  Tha il and (NEDB) 
ca l culated  the tota l impa ct o f  the American expenditure s by firs t 
reduc ing tota l expenditures in Table  4 by about one - f i fth , wh ich is  
the ma rginal p ropens ity to import set  up by the Bank of  Tha iland . In 
this manne r the leaka ge s  were e l imina ted . The res t o f  the expenditures 
were spent in Tha iland , they a s sume d . The Boa rd then mul t ip l ied the 
rema inde r by 2 . 4 ,  which is the ave ra ge mul t ipl ier . The resul t is the 
cha nge in income resul t ing from American expenditures .  
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The es t ima t ion is only a pp rox ima te ,  however ,  becaus e there 
is no way o f  tra c ing the tra ns a c t ions a fter the American s ol dier 
s pends his  money ; wha t the ma s s a ge g lirl s did with the s o l d ie r ' s 
money . I t  is  p os s ib l e  tha t the United S t a te s  expend itures have 
d ifferent mul t ipl iers , a ccording to the type of expend itures and 
geogra phi c  a rea s in wh i ch the money wa s spent . Tha t is , the money 
s pent in Bangkok will  have higher import cont ent a nd highe r mul t i -
p l ier tha n  the money s pent e l s ewhe re . Consump t ion expend itures by 
mil ita ry pers onnel tha t a re spent mo s tly in the ba s etowns , probably 
have l ower mul t i p l iers than the cons t ruct ion expenditures , which t end 
to go more to  the expans ion of the u s e  of Tha i res ources and inves t -
ment expend itures .  The re fo re , s e t t ing an avera ge mul t ip l ier o f  2 . 4 
and the ma rgina l propens ity to import o f  one - fifth s e ems a t  bes t 
ques t iona b l e . Emp irica l s tud ies have not been done to es tabl ish the 
mul t ip l iers . The mos t  s erious omi s s ion is the influence on fore ign 
inves tment , however ,  on income . 
S ome e s t ima t ions conclude tha t Amer ican expend iture s a ccounted 
for two - thirds of the inc rea s e  in GDP between 1 964 a nd 1 96 7 . 7 0  O thers 
conclude tha t the United S t a tes  expend itures a ccount for one -ha l f  of  
the increa s e  in GNP in 1 96 7 ,
7 1 
and more than one -ha l f  of  the increa s e  
i n  the GN P  during 1 9 6 6 -68 . 7 2  Currently i n  1 97 0 -7 1 , the American 
7 0  
Hermann Ha tz feldt , 2.E. ·  c it . ,  p .  10 . 
7 1
Na t iona l Economic Devel opment Boa rd , Economic Impa ct o f  the 
Vietname s e  Confl ict on the Tha i E conomy ,  unpubl ished document , Bangkok , 
May 1 968 ,  p . 2 . 
7 2  
B ank o f  Tha iland , The Impa ct of U . S . Mil ita ry Expend iture s on 
Tha iland ' s  Balance of Payments , unpub l i shed document , Bangkok , June 
1 96 9 , p .  1 .  
60  
expenditures contributed a ddit iona l income to the l o ca l economy o f  
about 5 p ercent o f  to t a l  GNP .
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In my o p inion , the s igni f icance o f  the American expendi ture s 
in the Tha i economy i s  unque s t ionab l e . The rea l imp a c t s , however , 
a re not a c cura tely determined in the above sources . The method  us e d  
in tho s e  s tudies i n  wh i ch a n  avera ge mul t ip l ier o f  2 . 4 is  emp l oyed , 
is not a pp rop r ia te fo r individua l s e ctors  o f  the economy . 
The resul t ob ta ined from the a ggre s s ion ana lys is does  not mea n  
tha t one should deny the relevance o f  the Tha i development p ro gram 
which a l s o  contr ibuted to e conomic growth . However ,  s ince America n  
expend itures w e r e  a t  a peak 5 percent o f  GNP in 1 96 8  and were not 
l ower than  3 . 2  percent from 1 96 6  to  1 97 1 , the s ignificance o f  the 
American expenditure s on economic growth canno t be den ied . (S ee 
Table  1 2) 
7 3Bank o f  Tha iland ,  U . S . Mil ita ry Expenditures in Tha iland , 
unpub l ished do cument , Bangkok , Janua ry 1 97 1 , p .  3 .  
CONCLUSION 
A l though i t  ha s been shown by s t a t is t ica l l y  s ignif icant 
' 
regre s s ion tha t United S ta te s  expenditures a re rel a ted to e conomic 
growth , the s tudy ha s s ome weakne s s es o The f irs t weaknes s  is  the 
existence of auto - correl a t ion in the s econd equa t ion . Neverthe l e s s , 
a n  ind ire ct a pp roa ch sub s tant ia ted  the thes is without auto -correl a -
t ion . A s e cond weaknes s  is the l a ck o f  empirica l resea rch and da ta 
concerning th is topic  in Tha il and . Fo r  example , an  avera ge mul t i -
p l ier  s e t  a t  2 . 4 i s  not ve ry a c cura te for determining the effe cts  o f  
United S ta tes  expend iture s o n  ind ividua l s e ctors o f  the economy . 
Furthermore , i t  woul d be  interes t ing i f  one could  include the amount 
o f  American fore ign a s s is tance during tha t p er io d  a s  an addit iona l 
va riable  in the regres s ion . The e f fects  o f  American expend�tures 
on ea ch s ector and the inclus ion o f  fore ign a id a re sugges ted for  
fu rthe r res ea rch . Mo reover ,  it  is  l ikely tha t , as  a resul t o f  the 
American withdrawa l ,  the Tha i gove rnment would be forced to a s sume 
the burden o f  mil ita ry expend itures fo r ma intenance on the abandoned 
b a s e s , l o gis t i c  support for t roop s , a nd s imila r  items on he r own . 
This addit iona l expend iture from the Tha i budget would b e  obta ined 
by trans ferring _ funds f rom the o ther development pro grams a nd woul d 
reta rd the economic g rowth . 
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During the pa s t  thirteen yea rs , the wa r in Vietnam gave 
e conomic impetus to many count ries  in S outhea s t  A s ia . The e ffect 
wa s part icula rly  s trong a fter  1 96 5  when American mil ita ry expend i ­
tures in S outhea s t  A s ia and the Fa r Ea s t  ros e  ra pidly , crea t ing 
e conomi c b enefits  to tho s e  countrie s . On the other hand , when the 
wa r ends , if the United S ta tes w i thdraws mo s t  or a l l  of her t roops  
from the  a rea , _ there wil l be an  unfa vo rab l e  effect  on the e conomies 
o f  S outhea s t  A s ia unl es s sub s t ituted by non -wa r expend itures . The 
e conomic imp a c t  resul t ing from w i thdrawa l may va ry in degree and 
form ,  depending on the types a nd a mounts  o f  the American expenditures 
in tha t pa rt icula r  e conomic sys t em ,  but there is  l it t l e  doubt tha t 
the effect  o f  w ithdrawa l wil l  be s ubs tant ia l . 
This s tudy shows  tha t i f  the United S ta tes  withdraws from 
S outhea s t  A s ia and Tha iland , the re w il l  be  a s ignif icant reduct ion 
in the ra t e  of e conomic growth in tha t country . It is  a s erious 
ma tte r , there fore , when important Tha i gove rnment o fficia l s  minimize 
the rol e  o f  Ame r ican expenditures in the recent growth o f  the Tha i  
e conomy . N o t  j u s t  a few pol iticians endeavo ring to  a l lay  the fea rs 
o f  the popula ce or to encoura ge good Tha i -United S t a te s  rel a t ions , 
even the s e r ious s tudies have overlooked the influence on gro s s  
na t iona l p roduct o f  fo reign inves tment tha t i s  det e rmined by Ameri can 
expend iture s . Without recognit ion of  the infl uenc e  o f  American expendi ­
tures on e a ch s ector  of  the e conomy a s  well  a s  e conomic growth , the 
na t ion cannot p repa re itsel f fo r w i thdrawa l .  No t  only will  the fa ll  
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in consumpt ion a nd fo re ign inves tment a ffect na t iona l income , but 
a s expend itures de crea s e  during w i thdrawa l , the re will  be  a decl ine 
in fore i gn exchange res e rve s wh i ch will decrea s e  the ra te of growth 
o f the money supply in the dome s t i c  economy . This reduct ion in the 
ra te of growth of the money supply  wil l fo rce the government to 
reverse the current monet a ry pol icy ca reful ly if infla t ion and 
depre s s ion a re to be avo ided . 
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THE RUSK-THANAT MEMORANDUM 74 
The Fore ign Minis ter  o f  Tha iland , Thana t Khoman , and the 
S e c reta ry o f  S ta te Dean Rus k  me t on s evera l  o cca s ions during the 
pa s t  few days fo r dis cus s ions on the current s itua t ion in S outh ­
ea s t  A s ia ,  the S outhea s t  A s ia Col l e c t ive De fens e Trea ty and the 
s e curity of Tha il and . 
The S e creta ry o f  S ta te rea ffirmed tha t the Un ited S ta tes  
rega rds the pres e rva t ion o f  the independence and integrity of  
Tha iland as  vita l to the  na t iona l inte re s t  of  the United S ta te s 
a nd to world pea ce . He expres s ed the firm intent ion o f  the 
United S ta tes  to a id Tha iland , i t s  a l ly and his toric  fr iend , in 
res is t ing Communis t a ggre s s ion a nd subve rs ion . 
The Foreign Min i s t e r  a nd the S ecreta ry o f  S ta te reviewed 
the c l o s e  a s s o c ia t ion of Tha iland a nd the United S ta tes in the 
S outheas t A s ia Co l l e c t ive De fens e T rea ty and a greed tha t such 
a $:::; ocia t ion is a n  effective de terrent to  d ire ct Communis t a ggre s ­
s ion a ga ins t Tha iland . They a greed tha t the T rea ty provides the 
b a s is for the s igna to ries col l e c t ively to a s s is t  Tha il and in ca s e  
o f  Communis t a rme d a tta ck a ga ins t the country . The S e c reta ry o f  
S ta te a s s ured the Foreign Minis t e r  tha t in the event o f  s uch 
a ggres s ion , the United S ta tes  intends to give ful l e ffect to its  
obl iga t ions under  the Trea ty to  a c t  to  mee t  the cormnon danger in 
a ccordance w ith its  cons t itut iona l p ro ce s s es . The S e cre t a ry o f  
S ta te rea ffirmed tha t th is  obl iga t ion o f  the United S ta tes  do es 
not depend upon the prio r  a greement of a l l  o the r pa rt ie s  to the 
T rea ty , s ince this Trea ty obl iga t ion is  ind iv idua l a s  we l l  a s  
col l e ct ive . 
In review ing mea sures to  mee t  indire c t  a ggres s ion , the 
S ecreta ry o f  S t a te s ta ted tha t the United  S ta tes rega rds its  
c ormnitment s to Tha iland under the S outhea s t  A s ia Co l l ect ive De fens e 
Trea ty a nd under its  b ila tera l e conomi c a nd mil ita ry a s s istance 
a greements with Tha iland as providing a n  important ba s is for Uni ted 
S ta tes a ct ions to help Tha iland meet ind ire ct a ggres s ion . In this 
conne ct ion the S e creta ry reviewed with the Fore ign Minister  the 
a ct ions be ing taken by the United S ta tes to a s s is t  the Repub l ic o f  
Vietnam t o  meet  the threa t o f  ind ire ct  a ggress ion . 
The Fo re ign Minis ter  a s s ured the S ecreta ry o f  S ta te o f  the 
determina t ion of the Government of Tha iland to  mee t  the threa t o f  
ind ire ct  a ggre s s ion b y  pursuing vigo rous ly mea sures fo r the economic 
a nd s o c ia l  wel fa re and the s a fety o f  its peop l e . 
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Department o f  S t a te for  the P res s , Ma rch 6 ,  1 96 2 , No . 145 . 
T ext o f  a j o int s ta tement by Fore ign Minis ter  Thana t Khoman o f Tha iland 
a nd Secreta ry o f  S ta te Dea n Rus k .  
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The s itua t ion in L a o s  wa s reviewed in deta il and ful l a gre e ­
ment wa s rea ched on the nece s s ity fo r the s tabil ity o f  S outhea s t  A s ia ,  
o f  a chieving a free , indep endent and t ruly neutra l Laos . 
The Fore i gn Minister  and the S e creta ry o f  S ta te rev iewed the 
mutua l e fforts o f  the ir  governments to  increa s e  the capab il ities  and 
rea d ine s s  o f  the Tha i a rmed forces  to  de fend the Kingdom . Th�y no ted  
a l so tha t the United  S ta tes  is  making a s igni ficant contr ibut ion to 
th is e f fo rt and tha t the United S ta t e s  intends to  a c ce l era te  future 
del ive ries to the grea tes t extent p o s s ib l e . The Se creta ry and the 
Fore ign Minis ter  a l s o  took no te o f  the wo rk of the Jo int Tha i -United 
S ta tes Corrnnittee  whi ch ha s been e s tabl ished in  Bangkok to  a s s ure 
e ffe c t ive coopera t ion in s o c ia l , e conomic and mil ita ry mea sures to 
increa s e  Tha iland ' s  na t iona l  ca p a b il it ie s . They a greed tha t this  
Joint Committee  and its  sub - committees shou l d  cont inue to  work 
t owa rd the mo s t  e f fe c t ive util iz a t ion o f  Tha i l a nd ' s  res ources and 
tho s e  provided by the United S t a t e s  to  p romo te Tha iland ' s develop ­
ment and s e cur ity . 
The Fore ign Minister  and the S e creta ry were in full  a greement 
tha t cont inued e conomic and s o c ia l  progre s s  is es s en t ia l  to  the s ta b il ­
i ty o f  Tha iland . They reviewed Tha iland ' s  impre s s ive e conomic and 
s o cia l  p ro gres s  and the Tha i Gove rnment ' s p lans to  a c ce l e ra te develop ­
ment , pa r t i cula rly Tha iland ' s  cont inuing de termina t ion ful ly to ut il ize 
i t s  own resources in moving towa rd its  deve lopment goa l s . 
The Fo re ign Minis t e r  a nd the S e creta ry o f  S ta te a l so dis cus s ed 
the des ira b il ity o f  an  ea rly conclus ion o f  a trea ty o f  friendship ,  
corrnne rce and naviga t ion between the two count ries whi ch woul d b r ing 
into a c cord with current cond itions the exi s t ing t rea ty o f  1 937 . 
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JOINT STATEMENT BETWEEN THA ILAND AND THE UNITED STATEs 7 5  
The Roya l Tha i Government and the United S t a t e s  Gove rnment 
t oday a nnounced the opening of t a lks to a r ra nge for a gra dua l redu c ­
t ion o f  l evel o f  United S ta te s  forces  i n  Tha iland cons is t ent with 
a s s es s ment o f  both gove rnments o f  the s e cur ity s itua t ion . 
The t a lks w i l l  be held  in the f irs t ins tance between the 
Fo re ign Minis t e r  o f  Tha iland , H .  E .  Thana t Khoma n , and the United 
S ta tes Amba s s ador  to  Tha il and , Leona rd Unger , in Bangkok , beginning 
on or about S ep t embe r  1 s t . More deta iled  convers a t ions in wh i ch 
Tha i and United S ta t e s  repre s enta t ives w i l l  p a rt ic ipa te w i l l  fol l ow 
to  pla n  fo r any reduct ions it  is  cons idered des ira b l e  to make ove r 
a period  o f  t ime a s s uming there is  no s ign ificant a l tera t ion in the 
s e curity s itua t ion in S outhea s t  A s ia . 
7 5  
Informa t ion Depa rtment , Minis try o f  Fore i gn A f fa irs , 
A ugus t 2 6 , 1 96 9 . 
APPENDIX C 
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JOINT ANNOUNCEMENT 7 6 
The Pres ident o f  the United  S ta tes  and the Prime Minis ter  
of  Tha iland a nnounced toda y tha t the  United S ta te s  Government and 
the Roya l Tha i Government have comp leted b ila tera l t a l ks to a rrange 
for  an  o rderly reduction of United  S ta tes  forces in Tha iland , whi ch 
a re here in connnect ion with the Vietnam Wa r .  
The two Gove rnments have a greed tha t a pp roxima tely 6 , 00 0  
United S ta tes mil ita ry pers onnel , from both the A i r Fo rce a nd the 
A rmy a re to  be w ithdrawn from Tha iland . They w i l l  be withdrawn 
a s  expedit ious ly a s  p os s ib l e  cons is tent with opera t iona l require ­
ments rela ted to the Vietnam confl ict . Redeployment a c t ion w i l l  
be gin with in a few weeks a nd it  is  planned tha t a l l  the forces  
invo lved will  have depa rted by July 1 ,  1 97 0 . 
The two Gove rnments will  cont inue to eva lua te the level o f  
United S ta te s  a rmed forces in Tha i l a nd in the l ight o f  the ir a s s es s ­
ment o f  devel opments in the Vietnam confl ict . 
7 6  Depa rtment o f  Informa t ion , Minis t ry o f  Fo re ign A ffa irs , 
'Bangkok , S ep t embe r  30 , 1 9 6 9 . 
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